Re: Criticisms of Blackmore's approach

From: Joe E. Dees (joedees@bellsouth.net)
Date: Sun Jun 11 2000 - 01:04:47 BST

  • Next message: Kenneth Van Oost: "Re: Criticisms of Blackmore's approach"

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    From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net>
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    Subject: Re: Criticisms of Blackmore's approach
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    From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
    Organization: Reborn Technology
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Re: Criticisms of Blackmore's approach
    Date sent: Fri, 9 Jun 2000 19:39:45 +0100
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    > On Fri, 09 Jun 2000, Raymond Recchia wrote:
    > >
    > >Imitation is probably the most basic means by which memes are transmitted
    > >and likely the most common form of
    > >memetic transmission in animals. For example, the using the stick trick to
    > >get ants (or is it termites) in chimpanzees is transmitted by imitation. We
    > >also see this in humans, as in the case of blacksmith or carpenter
    > >transmitting his trade to an apprentice largely through the process of
    > >imitation.
    >
    > Agreed. Good example.
    >
    > >Linguistic transmission though is a different process and may not involve
    > >any imitation at all. As hypothetical example consider the following:
    > >
    > >Mr Einstein frequently mutters the phrase 'E=mc2' in the presence of his
    > >parrot. After a while the parrot begins imitating Albert, copying tone and
    > >inflection to a such a degree that only a professional voice imitator could
    > >match it.
    > >
    > >Later Einstein gets another parrot. By this time he has stopped muttering
    > >'E=mc2' but his first parrot hasn't. The second parrot learns to imitate the
    > >first one.
    > >
    > >At some point, Mr. Heisenberg happens upon the parrots. He hears them
    > >imitating Mr. Einstein and realizes that the parrots have the solution to a
    > >problem Mr. Heisenberg has been unable to solve for years. Mr. Heisenberg
    > >is mute and cannot ever mutter the phrase 'E=mc2'. He does write it
    > >frequently though and many others learn it from him.
    > >
    > >Where are the memes? The parrot's are defineatly imitating. How can it be
    > >said (especially from a behavioral standpoint) that Mr. Heisenberg is?
    >
    > This is very easily handled from an information theory standpoint. The
    > parrots form an information channel, in principle no different from any
    > other. What is going on here is exactly the same as where a meme is
    > transmitted via, say, radio. Mr Heisenberg is passing a radio store, and
    > just happens to hear the formula being recited by someone on a talk radio
    > science show (don't know if there is such a thing in the US -- there is
    > here in the UK). It does not matter in the least whether the person who
    > recites the formula is the scientist, who understands it, or the presenter,
    > who does not. Come to that, Mr H might as well have heard it directly
    > from the lips of Mr E, and exactly the same process (regarding its relevant
    > aspects, that is) takes place in his head. The point is that he already
    > has all he needs in there, except for that one last building brick -- or
    > straw -- and he becomes enlightened. The channel through which that
    > brick or staw reached him is, assuming it's up to the job, otherwise
    > absolutely irrelevant.
    >
    > This is where I reach an accord -- sort of -- with Richard. What's
    > actually transmitted, the brick/straw, is quite minimal. What it
    > *means*, which is surely what matters, is in a sense reconstructed in
    > the mind of the recipient. Or to put it another way, it takes Mr H,
    > apparently quite an unusual man, to *decode* the message, the meme,
    > from its carrier, the spoken formula "E=mc2". Neither parrot, nor
    > the radio presenter (in this case) was capable of doing that, but so
    > what? They were only components of the information channel, anyway.
    > And, indeed, if all he actually heard was the formula, then for Mr H,
    > the fact that the radio scientist and Mr E, if he'd heard it from
    > either of them, *were* capable of decoding it, is irrelevant, because
    > they were only components of a channel, too.
    >
    > Does "E=mc2" contain the meme? That depends entirely on your point of
    > view. Or, to be more accurate, on whether you're capable of decoding
    > it. But the meme has certainly replicated, as it's now in the mind of
    > Mr H. Is this imitation? I'd say no, because of the decoding
    > required, as it is in all symbolic communication. I think decoded
    > memes and those passed on by direct imitation must be dysjunct sets.
    > But all symbolic communication is based on imitation. That's how it's
    > first learned. Imitation is not ubiquitous, but it is fundamental, and
    > I think it's perfectly reasonable to focus on it, where the fundamentals
    > of memetics are being discussed.
    >
    I'm encouraged to see you giving consciousness, cognizance and
    cognition its fair due.
    Howzabout this?
    Memetic dialectics:
    Level 1) showing: demonstration-imitation
    Level 2) telling: explanation-understanding
    Level 3) writing: composition-comprehension

    Each level depends upon the mastery of the prior levels to be itself
    learned. This proposal shows that I agree with your point that to
    learn to tell, one must be shown (referents for the word sounds),
    and to learn to write, one must be told (meanings) AND shown
    (written words). I would be interested in finding out about a
    possible falsification of this view; is there an instance of anyone
    who has learned to write with comprehension without first being
    able to speak (engage in discourse), say, a deaf mute who learned
    to read braille without having learned ASL (American Sign
    Language)? Imitation is not enough, however; if one learns to
    knapp a handaxe, yet never sees one used, does it really possess
    artifactual (frozen memetic) meaning for the imitator, or would
    spoken or written words possess meaning for those taught to
    recreate the sound or the script, but not taught the associations? I
    think not.
    > --
    > Robin Faichney
    >
    >
    > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    > For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
    >
    >

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    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



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