Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id IAA04692 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 22 Mar 2000 08:38:50 GMT Message-ID: <A4400389479FD3118C9400508B0FF230040BB8@DELTA.newhouse.akzonobel.nl> From: "Gatherer, D. (Derek)" <D.Gatherer@organon.nhe.akzonobel.nl> To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Subject: RE: objections to "memes" Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2000 09:36:10 +0100 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Robert:
BTW are there any
memetic conferences this summer in North America or Europe for that
matter? I would be obliged to anyone who can provide me with information.
Derek:
There's going to be one in Warwick in the summer. It was advertised on the
list, but unfortunately since we don't seem to have an archive any more,
I've completely lost all the details.
Robert:
Memes are not in the brain or in the behaviour - they re a theoretical
construct to describe how human behaviour is replicated.
Derek:
I think you're probably closer to me then, than to the thought
contagionists/internalists. I agree that replicating behaviour is the
primary thing. I'm not so sure, however, why we need such theoretical
contructs. If we're describing how behaviour is replicated, then let's just
do that. It's a question of Occam's Razor versus Occam's Hair Restorer.
For the internalists memes are more than a theoretical contruct, they are
'heteroderivative mnemon instantiations' which are actual things or patterns
of brain-stored information. You can see how this debate has unfolded in
the pages of Journal of Memetics.
As somebody who has worked in linguistics, you might appreciate the
following argument against internalism. Internalists insist that awareness
of propositions/sentences, eg awareness of 'bee venom invigorates' or
awareness of 'Christ is Lord' (not my examples, these are from an
internalist JoM article) are actually stored in brains as mnemons. This
seems to me to ignore the Chomskian demonstration that propositions in
language are generated rather then stored. In my JoM paper, I use an
example 'Napoleon died in x' where x is any year. Back in the 50s in his
debate with Skinner, Chomsky used 'The house that Jack built'. It's the
same kind of argument. We can generate an infinite set of propositions. If
we generate and utter them, we are presumably aware of them. In fact, even
before uttering them, we are aware of them. For instance, I am aware of
_every_ proposition of the form 'Napoleon died in x' (only one of which is
true, of course - and I'm aware of which one). In order to store an
infinite set of propositions, we'd need infinite brains, so it's clear that
we don't store propositions.
This isn't just about belief in a proposition (eg. my belief that Napoleon
died in 1821). The internalists claim that belief in a proposition is a
_separate_ mnemon, presumably with its own separate brain storage location,
to awareness of a proposition. So even though I have only to store a single
mnemon about belief in Napoleon's death, I have to store an infinite set of
incorrect propositions of which I am aware.
Internalism is thus founded on a rejection of one of the fundamental points
of modern linguistics. I'm not saying Chomsky's right about every thing,
but he's right about this. Anyway, since it's clear you're not an
internalist - it seems your position is more or less that of John Wilkins -
then I dare say I'm preaching to the converted.
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