Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id DAA05068 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 12 Mar 2000 03:01:03 GMT Message-Id: <4.1.20000311123422.009d26c0@mail.rdc1.bc.wave.home.com> X-Sender: dplante@mail.rdc1.bc.wave.home.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.1 Date: Sat, 11 Mar 2000 19:01:18 -0800 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk From: Dan Plante <dplante@home.com> Subject: RE: meaning in memetics In-Reply-To: <NBBBIIDKHCMGAIPMFFPJIEOFEHAA.richard@brodietech.com> References: <003a01bf7e3f$c3f33a80$cf11bed4@default> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Richard Brodie wrote:
<<
>
> I don't think we yet have quantitative data, but if you read my book Virus of
> the Mind you'll remember I speculated as to many of the properties that might
> make a meme fit:
>
> - making sense (a wrong, simple explanation dominates a complex, more
> accurate one)
> - being associated with animalistic drives such as danger, food, sex
> - having to do with celebrities or ways to climb the status hierarchy
>
> "Truth" only fits into the first category in most cases. One benefit of
> academia is that it links up the quest for truth with the third category.
>>
...... which in turn "links up" with the second category (usually). I agree with
this in essence, Richard. The dynamics of one feeds forward and back to the
others, but in a dependant manner. This suggests a heirarchial model, where
"drives" affect perceptions which feed back to drives, and all this, in turn,
shapes conceptions which feed back to perceptions (not only HOW we individually
percieve things, but even WHERE we decide to look to percieve things) and back
to drives (gratification). The thing to remember is that drives and percepts
can exist without concepts, but not the other way around, indicating acsending
dependancy. This has probably been stated before, in one way or another, in
many different venues by many different people in the past - old hat, I
imagine.
But I also think that underscoring the paradigm of heirarchial dependancy would
serve the goal of reconciling (after some "growing pains") the core idea of
memetics with currently established doctrine. It seems to me that the current
"toolbox" of memetics, semiotics, hermeneutics, genetics, behaviourial
psychology, anthropology, cognitive biochemistry et al, is like a zoo of
objects bereft of a framework in which to establish relationships. It also
seems to me that memetics is in dire need of a relational framework with which
to settle the question (as some have asked here lately) of how wide the net
should be cast: mental only, or meta-mental (i.e. curtural), or both, or none
(my two cents rests on a description of the dynamics at the interface between
mental and cultural - I doubt it will be wider than that).
Heirarchial dependancy is a general organizational "construct" left in the
"wake" of the evolutionary process. Since all percieved order can be shown to
be a result of the process of this more generically percieved evolution (the
dynamics of which were explained by H. Haken - synergetics), any other
relational framework (electronics, for example) can be used as a "template" for
formulating the specific structure of a nascent discipline. The trick, of
course, is understanding what aspects of an existing framework are general (eg:
the relationships of one level are the objects of the next or: the "semantics"
of one level become the "syntax" of the next, subordinate constructs can appear
intact across higher levels, etc), and which are specific to that particular
framework (eg: "transcription", or "gene"). When we fail to do this, our
analogies, however cherished, break down under scrutiny, throwing the emerging
system into chaos. Also, perfectly valid concepts of systemic activity at
different levels of description (mechanistic memetics vs. parametrics based on
meaning (hi Robin, hi Joe) may seem to be in conflict when they're not. Chaos
again ensues. A slight shift in the ontological POV that subtly "colors" our
percepts and concepts might provide a perspective that allows us to see around
things that were in our way before.
On the other hand, chaos is a good thing, since it is through this mechanism
that systems "hunt" for basins of attraction (stable answers), producing
emergent complexity. In fact, I just realised that it was my perception of
chaotic paralysis in these topics on this list in the last few months that
prompted me to write this. I guess Haken has a point.
I don't profess to have any answers, folks. I don't even like to say I have any
good ideas (unless cornered with an electric cattle prod), but I think this is
a way to figure out where (and how) to look to formulate the kinds of questions
that may lead to right answers.
As an aside: If you prefer, as I do, to formulate your models based on the
results of peer-reviewed, empirical research, but do not have access to the
papers themselves because you're not an academic (as I'm not), then I recommend
reading the books by the researchers themselves (it's just that the findings
will be a couple of years old by then):
Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behaviour - J. A. Scott
Kelso
Creating Mind: How the Brain Works - John E. Dowling
I should say up front that these are difficult to get through (especially
"Dynamic Patterns") even if you have a mathematical background (which I don't)
or a technical background (which I do). The thing is, I figure you have to slug
through this stuff if you want to successfully build a new theory, rather than
cobble together a straw house with a short half-life built on other people's
unsubstantiated opinions (which is what this email is, for instance).
After reading these books back-to-back, it's interesting to note how the
general ideas in each book complement each other, even though Dowling deals
with biochemical and structural specifics, while Kelso deals with synergistic
and systemic generalities in a mathematical way. It is also useful to note
where these works reside in terms of the heirarchy of emergent systems from
neurobiology to culture: right near the bottom. If anyone is aware of a
similarly complimentary duo of books, just as grounded in peer-reviewed
research, but near the other end of the scale (maybe in the fields of
cognitive-neurophysiology/linguistics/semiotics, etc) I'd be grateful.
I hope to widen the "pinched-off middle" of the hour-glass-shaped thing that is
my understanding of everything from genes at the bottom, to governments at the
top. I think that the neural correlates of percepts/concepts, if such a thing
is determined in the future through fMRI and the cognitive sciences
(inevitalbe, in my estimation), will lie close to that middle, and a process of
conclusion (from the bottom up) and inference (from the top down) may be the
best way to divine the specific form/function that this "middle" takes.
But I don't think this "middle" is where we will decide memetics lives. I think
there is already enough information available to us to discern where memetics
fits and, as a result, also the extent to which it should apply. It looks like
the domain of memetics will overlap several other already well established
fields that are currently less well grounded mathematically, relationally and
structurally (mostly because their dogma does not express or even imply their
place in a dependant heirarchy of emergent systems). I see a fight for
survival, and ultimately an absorption of sorts, coming up in the next few
years.
Should be fun.
Dan
>
> Richard Brodie <mailto:richard@brodietech.com>richard@brodietech.com
> www.memecentral.com/rbrodie.htm
>
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