Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id FAA11447 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 5 Mar 2000 05:49:39 GMT Message-Id: <200003050550.AAA17568@mail1.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Sat, 4 Mar 2000 23:51:39 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: Monkeys stone herdsman in Kenya In-reply-to: <00030505051400.00357@faichney> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
Organization: Reborn Technology
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: Monkeys stone herdsman in Kenya
Date sent: Sun, 5 Mar 2000 04:55:01 +0000
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Wed, 09 Apr 2036, Mark M. Mills wrote:
> >Joe,
> >
> >>... My position is in many ways a
> >>synthesis of Lynch and Gatherer, as I do not see how memes can
> >>fulfill their evolutionary and multiplicative functions without both
> >>components (within and between) of the single memetic coin.
> >
> >I doubt the Lynch and Gatherer definitions blend very well.
> >
> >We probably all agree that there are 'behaviors' and 'neural foundations'
> >for behaviors. It seems unnecessarily confusing to claim both are a
> >meme. Gatherer defines meme as the behavior itself. Lynch defines the
> >meme as the neural foundation. Both are fairly straight forward and both
> >have their own logic, their own model. Determining which model provides
> >the most utility seems similar to deciding between Copernican and
> >Ptolemaic celestial models. I don't think one can blend Copernican and
> >Ptolemy.
>
> Perhaps not, but there is a solution to the memetic "blending" problem: just as
> genes are not DNA sequences, but encoded in such sequences (Dennett argues
> this in Darwin's Dangerous Idea, and I've argued it here, at least once), so
> memes are neither behaviours nor "neural foundations", but encoded in both.
> The transformation from brain state to behaviour, and vice versa, is then
> considered en/decoding (which is which depends on from which end you're looking
> at it). Dennett also, by the way, sees memes in both brains and behaviour (or
> at least did at the time of Consciousness Explained), while the en/decoding bit
> is my own. When Dennett says that memes are at the level of semantics rather
> than syntax, i.e. there is no "brain language" in which all instances of the
> same meme would be stored in a neurally identical fashion in different brains,
> that can be taken to mean very simply that what's encoded is the same, though
> the encoding varies -- and what's encoded is simply the corresponding behaviour.
>
This is an eminently reasonable comment, with the provisio that
communicative actions including speech, are encoded
significations themselves; it's just that the coding schemas are
different. Each memetic form (neural synaptic potential patterns,
significant actions) is a translation of the other.
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
>
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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