Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id BAA05875 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Fri, 3 Mar 2000 01:36:08 GMT Message-Id: <200003030134.UAA11617@mail4.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2000 19:38:03 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: new line: what's the point? In-reply-to: <00030218461500.00761@faichney> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
Organization: Reborn Technology
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: new line: what's the point?
Date sent: Thu, 2 Mar 2000 18:29:46 +0000
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Wed, 01 Mar 2000, Soc Microlab 2 wrote:
> >This still leaves the question of what *level* memetics becomes a useful
> >application, and I say, (after Dennett) that it is at the level of meaning rather than below that. (see "who's
> >afraid of reductionism?" in DDI for more on this).
>
> I think maybe uncertainty about "meaning" and "intentionality" is causing a
> problem here. Many take both of these terms to imply subjectivity, which I
> don't think Dennett does.
>
How can an entity that does not possess subjectivity either mean
or intend anything? Short answer: it can't. Subjectivity is an a
priori sine qua non for both signification and intentionality.
>
> My main concern is to say that memetics need, and
> should, have no subjective element.
>
You believe, following your particular sect of your religion, that
there is and can be no such creature as a subject, so you
proselytizationally and self-contradictorally attempt to excise all
reference to subjectivity from EVERYTHING. P. S. It is you
yourSELF who is attempting this (whack from a staff).
>
>That's my main beef with Joe, too.
> However, with subjectivity eliminated, I'm no longer sure what "the level of
> meaning" means. But how about this: one meme, in two different brains, is
> identified as such not by its encoding in any mind or brain "language" (ie
> syntactically), but by its effects on behaviour: these individuals behave in a
> relevantly similar fashion.
>
This sounds like what it is: a regression to the Watsonian
behavioorism that was discredited during the cognitive revolution in
the '70's. Minds, which are what brains of sufficient size and
complexity DO (provide the material substrate for individual
complexly emergent dynamically recursive self- and other-
conscious awarenesses, i. e. self-aware minds) will react to the
same meme in differing fashions depending upon their
developmental histories and their memories of them, their
attitudinal proclivities, their environments, their cognitive abilities,
etc., in short, according to the reaction and interrelation of the
meme with the gestalt of the cognitive terrain which it permeates
and which permeates it, and in which it naturally gravitates to,
assimilates and accommodates to (that is, adapts to) its
individually most fit niche.
>
> BTW, on looking at Consciousness Explained for the first time in ages -- years,
> in fact -- I realised that Dennett and I share what I thought was my own idea:
> that memes are to be found in *both* brains and behaviour. He even uses
> the same metaphor, saying that the meme in the brain is in a sort of pupal
> stage. The disappointment in realising I'm not the originator of this is nicely
> balanced by my pleasure at being in such distinguished company. :-)
>
Memes are both entirely mental (when they pupate and mutate,
that is, when WE THINK about them) and both mental and physical
(when we attempt their replication through transmission/reception -
such attempts can - and do - fail, depending upon, among other
things, the acceptance or rejection of the intended receiver), just as
human perception and action are both mental and physical, and in
fact perceptual change involves action and action involves
perceptual change (the two are never found in isolation).
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
>
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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