Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id TAA07922 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 28 Feb 2000 19:50:46 GMT Message-Id: <200002281949.OAA12380@mail2.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 13:53:11 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-transfer-encoding: Quoted-printable Subject: Re: memetics-digest V1 #130 In-reply-to: <00022707432600.00404@faichney> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk>
Organization: Reborn Technology
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: memetics-digest V1 #130
Date sent: Mon, 28 Feb 2000 19:04:45 +0000
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Tue, 15 Feb 2000, Soc Microlab 2 wrote:
> >If you're
> >looking for the importance of physical instantiation in memetics then I (and Dennett) think you're barking up
> >the wrong tree.
>
> I'm most certainly not doing that, but...
>
> >It's the MEANING that gets copied, nothing else, and it's the meaning that
> >makes the issue important.
>
> What is MEANING, and how does it get copied?
>
Main Entry: mean·ing
Pronunciation: 'mE-ni[ng]
Function: noun
Date: 14th century
1 a : the thing one intends to convey especially by language :
PURPORT b : the thing that is conveyed especially by language :
IMPORT
2 : something meant or intended : AIM <a mischievous meaning
was apparent>
3 : significant quality; especially : implication of a hidden or special
significance <a glance full of meaning>
4 a : the logical connotation of a word or phrase b : the logical
denotation or extension of a word or phrase
- meaning adjective
- mean·ing·ly /-ni[ng]-lE/ adverb
Meaning gets copied by means of communication.
>
> Is it hoisted by a skyhook or a
> crane? I'm still (re)investigating Dennett on intentionality (I admit my
> previous study was not as thorough as it might have been), but whether
> intentionality or memes "comes first", memetics, for Dennett, absolutely
> definately does not depend on subjectivity. Consider this quote:
>
> A last hope for the Darwin-dreaders is simply to deny that what happens to
> memes when they enter a mind could ever, ever be explained in "reductionistic,"
> mechanistic terms. (DDI p368)
>
> Clearly, those who argue against so-called reductionist explanations using the
> concepts of meme "software" running on genetically designed "hardware" (or
> "wetware") are Dennettian Darwin-dreaders, skyhook-true-believers. Which (in
> broad terms) was the main point I was trying to make there.
>
No we're not; we just recognize that the hardware has, due to
genetically based evolution, become so complex as to admit of
recursivity, self-referentiality and self-awareness. Genetics has
evolved to the point where it has overthrown itself by programming
us to have the capacity to transcend our programming, and to
create a rapidly evolving (by genetic standards) memetically
mediated culture. The position is called emergent cognitive
materialism, and not only are Daniel C. Dennett and Jerry A. Fodor
adherents, but it has become the dominant stance in the field of
cognitive psychology.
>
> To get a little more specific, regarding the syntactic/semantic dichotomy, it
> seems to me that in this context the distinction is that of level of
> sophistication of encoding. That the same meme is not encoded in the same
> way in different brains does not mean that it is not encoded there, or that the
> encoding is somehow special, transcending analysis. The most sophisticated
> encryption techniques actually change between messages, and that's (roughly)
> what is happening here. But the principle remains the same: memes are encoded
> in brains, and in behaviour, and at no point is a Cartesian superhero required
> to step in and magically interpret, process, select or do anything else to them
> -- contrary to what some people would have us believe.
>
Here we see the replication of the Zen Doctrine of No-Self Meme for
which Blackmore has been so roundly and correctly criticized. It is
not necessary for the self to be opposed to or isolated from the
body from which it autochthonously rises to observe both itself and
its world. This is an either-or myth; a straw dilemma which distorts
beyond all recognition the process of affairs to which it purports to
refer. The encoding does not transcend analysis, but the content
necessarily contained in the encoding (for one cannot encode
nothing) calls for semantic, not syntactic, analysis (let me once
again take the opportunity to urge you to read the book ON
MEANING by A. J. Greimas). Any good grammar book can
explain to you the syntax of a language (nouns, verbs, etc. and
when in a sentence it is appropriate to use them), but none of that
can communicate a message in the absence of content, and
grammatically impeccable encoding can still result in nonsense
(colorless green ideas sleep furiously). Semantics has a meaning-
structuration of its own, and the word meanings possess relations
of similarity and difference, identicality and opposition, because
their referents in the world also do. In other words, word meanings
cohere in their relations in the way that they do rather than in other
ways because the referents to which they correspond also cohere
in that (rather than another) manner. This is how one can unite the
coherence and correspondence theories of truth.
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
>
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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