Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id UAA26225 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 12 Apr 2001 20:04:21 +0100 Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2001 19:45:07 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Determinism Message-ID: <20010412194507.B1393@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <F21kiyPoHZgzDgtZKpj00005c1f@hotmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.15i In-Reply-To: <F21kiyPoHZgzDgtZKpj00005c1f@hotmail.com>; from ecphoric@hotmail.com on Thu, Apr 12, 2001 at 01:20:27PM -0400 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Thu, Apr 12, 2001 at 01:20:27PM -0400, Scott Chase wrote:
> > >
> > > Scientific conclusion: A (the higher announced decision) causes B
> > > (the accessing of the particular area of the supporting lower
> > > material substrate). Once again, it's called science...
> >
> >I thought you said causal chains can't be traced in such complex systems
> >as the mind/brain?
> >
> Wouldn't the fatal objection be to ask what caused A itself, lest A popped
> into existence from thin air.
It is true that the concepts of willpower and consciousness represent
twin terminii, an ultimate source and sink of information, respectively.
There can be no answer either to what caused a free action or to what was
the effect of a perception. Of course, the obvious way to resolve such
loose ends is to plug them together, so that perceptions cause actions.
But that means there's no actor, which suggestion very much upsets Joe,
so I better say no more! ;-)
would call A a decomposable component. Maybe
> this component could send arrows downward, but other compents below it exist
> previous to A in the causal network. "Top-down causation" would be limited
> in that it is ultimately open to decopmosition and that it is not a general
> flow direction, perhaps a mere exception to the rule of bottom up.
See my message of a few minutes ago on this. I don't believe in
"vertical causation" (top-down *or* bottom-up), and I think I present
an unanswerable case against it there.
> Mindbrain is less dualistic than mind/brain. Those who exlore psychosomatic
> stuff might chime in and say a mental state can influence a body state. If
> so, this mental state itself decomposes to a neural state.
I don't follow your reasoning there.
-- Robin Faichney Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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