Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id AAA23255 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 12 Apr 2001 00:21:21 +0100 X-Originating-IP: [209.240.220.143] From: "Scott Chase" <ecphoric@hotmail.com> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Determinism Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 19:17:24 -0400 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed Message-ID: <F31Ihs6hdn1KVHYS8YV000054df@hotmail.com> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 11 Apr 2001 23:17:24.0900 (UTC) FILETIME=[91612E40:01C0C2DD] Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
>Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>Subject: Re: Determinism
>Date: Mon, 9 Apr 2001 11:00:14 +0100
>
>On Sun, Apr 08, 2001 at 10:05:24AM -0400, Scott Chase wrote:
> > >
> > > > I suppose you're not intrigued by the plot of that wondrous
>Berkeleyian
> > >(the
> > > > idealist not the university) movie _The Matrix_?
> > >
> > >I very much enjoyed that film, but no way is it "Berkeleyian". People
>are
> > >fed a false reality, but there is a real reality out there. (Otherwise
> > >there couldn't be a false one, could there?)
> > >
> > It's been a while since I read Berkeley, so I'm hesitant to go out too
>far
> > on a limb, but I did get the impression that you could co-opt his
>arguments
> > for God as the Mind which generates our reality with an argument based
>on a
> > virtual reality generating computer "mind". For Berkeley, to be is to be
> > perceived (*esse is percipi*). For some to exist, it must be generated
>by a
> > mind, based on the argument that we can't distinguish objects from
>ideas.
> > Berkeley cannot be acccused of solipsism is that the reason thing do not
> > cease to exist when we close our eyes is that they are being generated
>in
> > the mind of God. Again, substitute a computer in the place of God and
>IMO
> > you end up with _The Matrix_.
>
>If you're saying that the notion of such a pervasive and persuasive
>virtual reality is Berkeleyian, then I guess it could be called that.
>But my point was that what I take to be the most significant thing he
>said -- that there is no other reality -- does not apply to The Matrix.
>Of course, what's significant for me isn't necessarily significant
>for you.
>
> > Added to Berkeley would be Schopenhauer's modification of Kant's
> > phenomenal/noumenal distinction by hybridizing it with the web of Maya
>ala
> > the Vedas. The computer network ("web") in _The Matrix_ generates a
>Mayan
> > veil of illusory appearance. Only a few actually manage to wake up and
> > experience the *ding in sich*.
>
>Which is decidedly unBerkeleyian.
>
OK, maybe Berkeley wouldn't have set the noumenal apart from the phenomenal,
but at least for the context of the computer as taking the place of an
Absolute Mind which generates reality, Berkeley might partially apply. Those
objects that one experienced while hooked up within the Matrix were mere
ideas implanted into the mind. They were immaterial and IIRC Berkeley was a
hardcore immaterialist. Implanted ideas generated by a computer could not be
distinguished from the material objects they represented. The objects
weren't really there.
>
> > Maybe I'm shoehorning idealism where it don't belong....
>
>I think so. Sorry!
>
>
Sans Schopenhauer's wanton pessimism, maybe _The Matrix_ is more
Schopenhauerian. I'll need to delve back into Schopenhauer, but I think he
had a spot for Berkeley in his philosophy. The world as idea...generated by
a computer and implanted into one's mind.
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