Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id OAA22176 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 11 Apr 2001 14:33:38 +0100 Message-ID: <3AD45C63.71DDD7BF@bioinf.man.ac.uk> Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 14:30:11 +0100 From: Chris Taylor <Christopher.Taylor@man.ac.uk> Organization: University of Manchester X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.76 [en] (Windows NT 5.0; U) X-Accept-Language: en To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Determinism References: <013f01c0bd6b$21682e80$5eaefea9@rcn.com>; <3AD133AA.6664.BBCD42@localhost> <00ca01c0c113$29cfd680$5eaefea9@rcn.com> <20010409183947.A685@reborntechnology.co.uk> <003001c0c120$2cb138a0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> <20010410091320.A553@reborntechnology.co.uk> <3AD2DB0C.10E293B9@bioinf.man.ac.uk> <20010410133332.D1720@reborntechnology.co.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Robin Faichney wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 10, 2001 at 11:06:04AM +0100, Chris Taylor wrote:
> > > > Freedom is subjective, not illusory.
> >
> > > Agreed.
> >
> > Would a person given a choice, at exactly the same point in time, under
> > exactly the same environmental conditions, with the same orientation of
> > molecules and distribution of charges around their body (incl. nervous
> > system), always make the same choice? [Thereby obeying simple
> > deterministic causality].
>
> The only way two scenarios can be absolutely identical is if you look
> at one scenario twice. In which case, the same decision would be
> made.
>
> I hope you don't think that's a glib or tricksy answer. I mean it
> absolutely seriously. If everything is the same, then everything will
> be the same.
Nope - that's cool. That's the foundation.
> > If this is true (and I think it's stated in a watertight enough way to
> > be unarguable) I'm interested in how we work within that to get our
> > feeling of free choice - I know that on different days I might make a
> > different choice about the same thing (because internals have changed,
> > and so have other externals), so am I building (flawed and internally
> > different) models of future behaviour all the time that come out at
> > equivalent fitness,
>
> Sorry, don't know what you mean by that.
>
> > or is there a more formal 'rounding' process going
> > on (i.e. most things seem roughly equivalent when not directly compared
> > side by side - you can tell different thickness of paper apart well when
> > they are both there to compare, but not so well when the examinations of
> > the two sheets are a day apart).
>
> Nope, I just don't get this. You are free, though your molecules and
> your brain cells are not. The concept of freedom only applies to creatures
> with some intelligence (I won't try to quantify how much), and brain cells
> have none -- they're just tiny bits of electrochemical gear.
>
> The only problem I see here is to get your head around the meaning
> of "subjective". The way I see it (!) is: because something is
> only evident from one point of view does *not* imply it's illusory.
> What "subjective" means in this context is "evident from only one point
> of view". All of our experience tells us we're free, to some extent.
> ANY theory that denies such a self-evident truth has to be wrong.
> In fact, the concept of freedom derives from our experience of it, so
> that we are free is true BY DEFINITION! So all we have to do now is
> to understand the relationship between our brain cells and ourselves,
> where that they are determined, and that we are free, are facts that
> the theory has to account for. It's not an easy job, but there really
> is no alternative, and I think I've made real progress on it (standing
> on the shoulders of those such as Dennett and Nagel).
I'm interested in how we generate our choice - competing 'solutions'
will often be ranked by a closer evaluation (i.e. a deeper comparison
with relevant stuff), but where that does not occur, for example in a
snap decision, or with poor knowledge (the classic casket choice, most
famously in The Merchant of Venice, for example), do we just have a
pseudorandom number generator to toss a coin? Is it a case of which
memes have most recently been active (had a nice dream about a forest,
therefore picked a green thing over a turquoise thing, had a nice dream
about the sea, therefore vice versa - the one I think Dennet would go
for).
Ecosystem evolution is as much about serendipity as it is about
'fitness'; here chance decides who fills the niche. Where determinism
comes in is that in hindsight (frankly, predictive power, or power to
act, is irrelevant joe) we can see why one species, rather than another,
was available; why the weather killed off the other possible candidate
last summer; why the blah blah blah (yadda yadda - I like that one).
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Chris Taylor (chris@bioinf.man.ac.uk)
http://bioinf.man.ac.uk/ »people»chris
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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