Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id NAA18974 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 10 Apr 2001 13:40:48 +0100 Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 13:33:32 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Determinism Message-ID: <20010410133332.D1720@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <013f01c0bd6b$21682e80$5eaefea9@rcn.com>; <3AD133AA.6664.BBCD42@localhost> <00ca01c0c113$29cfd680$5eaefea9@rcn.com> <20010409183947.A685@reborntechnology.co.uk> <003001c0c120$2cb138a0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> <20010410091320.A553@reborntechnology.co.uk> <3AD2DB0C.10E293B9@bioinf.man.ac.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.15i In-Reply-To: <3AD2DB0C.10E293B9@bioinf.man.ac.uk>; from Christopher.Taylor@man.ac.uk on Tue, Apr 10, 2001 at 11:06:04AM +0100 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Tue, Apr 10, 2001 at 11:06:04AM +0100, Chris Taylor wrote:
> > > Freedom is subjective, not illusory.
>
> > Agreed.
>
> Would a person given a choice, at exactly the same point in time, under
> exactly the same environmental conditions, with the same orientation of
> molecules and distribution of charges around their body (incl. nervous
> system), always make the same choice? [Thereby obeying simple
> deterministic causality].
The only way two scenarios can be absolutely identical is if you look
at one scenario twice. In which case, the same decision would be
made.
I hope you don't think that's a glib or tricksy answer. I mean it
absolutely seriously. If everything is the same, then everything will
be the same.
> If this is true (and I think it's stated in a watertight enough way to
> be unarguable) I'm interested in how we work within that to get our
> feeling of free choice - I know that on different days I might make a
> different choice about the same thing (because internals have changed,
> and so have other externals), so am I building (flawed and internally
> different) models of future behaviour all the time that come out at
> equivalent fitness,
Sorry, don't know what you mean by that.
> or is there a more formal 'rounding' process going
> on (i.e. most things seem roughly equivalent when not directly compared
> side by side - you can tell different thickness of paper apart well when
> they are both there to compare, but not so well when the examinations of
> the two sheets are a day apart).
Nope, I just don't get this. You are free, though your molecules and
your brain cells are not. The concept of freedom only applies to creatures
with some intelligence (I won't try to quantify how much), and brain cells
have none -- they're just tiny bits of electrochemical gear.
The only problem I see here is to get your head around the meaning
of "subjective". The way I see it (!) is: because something is
only evident from one point of view does *not* imply it's illusory.
What "subjective" means in this context is "evident from only one point
of view". All of our experience tells us we're free, to some extent.
ANY theory that denies such a self-evident truth has to be wrong.
In fact, the concept of freedom derives from our experience of it, so
that we are free is true BY DEFINITION! So all we have to do now is
to understand the relationship between our brain cells and ourselves,
where that they are determined, and that we are free, are facts that
the theory has to account for. It's not an easy job, but there really
is no alternative, and I think I've made real progress on it (standing
on the shoulders of those such as Dennett and Nagel).
-- Robin Faichney Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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