Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id KAA09452 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Fri, 6 Apr 2001 10:12:55 +0100 Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2001 09:40:01 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Determinism Message-ID: <20010406094001.A990@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <F7BnccYTjr8cU6xfPTe000013e8@hotmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.15i In-Reply-To: <F7BnccYTjr8cU6xfPTe000013e8@hotmail.com>; from ecphoric@hotmail.com on Thu, Apr 05, 2001 at 08:06:17PM -0400 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Thu, Apr 05, 2001 at 08:06:17PM -0400, Scott Chase wrote:
>
> >On 04/05/01 09:03, Chris Taylor said this-
> >
> > >Actually this is worth asking: Is there anyone on this list who doesn't
> > >think that a brain composed of neurons, interacting through electrical,
> > >chemical and mechanical routes only, is enough to make a mind?
> >
> >Yup. Me.
> >
> >If it ain't in a human body, we have no proof that it's possible. I do
> >happen to think that the 'brain in a box' hypothesis is bogus. The mind
> >has fingers and toes and eyes and ears.
> >
> I suppose you're not intrigued by the plot of that wondrous Berkeleyian (the
> idealist not the university) movie _The Matrix_?
I very much enjoyed that film, but no way is it "Berkeleyian". People are
fed a false reality, but there is a real reality out there. (Otherwise
there couldn't be a false one, could there?)
> I grant that I'm probably
> not having my thoughts and perecptions generated by a computer, but the
> argument does set a neat little contrast with other views. I'm not formally
> acquainted with the B.I.V. argument, but have caught snippets in neverending
> threads on usenet.
You may or may not consider it significant that in The Matrix, these are
not disembodied brains in vats, but complete people. But even where
an actual brain is in a vat, I'd suggest that, given sufficient input
*and* output, with feedback (so what I do affects what I see), and social
interaction through that mechanism, a mind could develop. It's not the
actual physical body that's required, but all the experience it gives us.
> I'd consider *my* car an extension of *me*. If a bird poops on *my* car, it
> has in essence pooped on *me*. I wonder if my mind inteacts with my car in
> some strange way.
Why "strange"? Surely your mind interacts with your car in very
straightforward ways. But we need to distinguish direct interaction,
e.g. when driving, from phenomena like the sense of ownership, for
which direct interaction probably isn't actually required, though I'm
sure it helps. As regards identification (poop on my car, poop on me),
the object of it need not even exist. "I am spiritually an Atlantean!"
Though that probably applies to the sense of ownership too. "You
should see my beautiful unicorn! Unfortunately, he's invisible."
> Would one's personal diary be a compoent of their mind? Can a mind be
> partially offloaded onto other media? Those tought might not be easily
> recollected several months later unless ecphorized by the cues in a diary.
Absolutely. Any scrawl on the back of an envelope is a memetic
download/backup.
-- Robin Faichney Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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