Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id LAA06913 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Fri, 30 Mar 2001 11:45:26 +0100 Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2001 11:07:37 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: The Demise of a Meme Message-ID: <20010330110737.A1013@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3AC0CC5C.4426.37BBB8@localhost>; <20010329095746.A535@reborntechnology.co.uk> <3AC399DF.27798.88DBD7@localhost> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.15i In-Reply-To: <3AC399DF.27798.88DBD7@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Thu, Mar 29, 2001 at 08:23:59PM -0600 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Thu, Mar 29, 2001 at 08:23:59PM -0600, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> On 29 Mar 2001, at 9:57, Robin Faichney wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Mar 27, 2001 at 05:22:36PM -0600, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> > > On 27 Mar 2001, at 10:35, Robin Faichney wrote: > > > A skeptic
> > would say there's nothing to rule out a complete causal > >
> > explanation at the neural level from impingement of air pressure waves
> > > > ("instructions as to what to think about") on the subject's
> > eardrums > > to excitation of specific neural areas as observed. No
> > hypothetical > > "will" or "self" need be involved. > > > I'm sure
> > that if a subject answers, no, I decided to think about X > instead of
> > read Y, that the appropriate components would light up > on the scan.
> >
> > I'm sure they would, but so what?
> >
> Well, it would mean that the expoerimenter's instruction to the
> subject to access X capacity did not cause the subject to do so,
> 'impingement of air pressure waves' notwithstanding.
You miss the point, big time. You think a determinist would agree
that you're free just because you do something other than you're told?[1]
If that line of thinking is good enough for you, Joe, that's fine.
As a common sense sort of attitude, it works -- even for me! On a
*purely* pragmatic level, that is. Because it's not philosophy. And if
you rely on this sort of argument in an academic context, you're heading
for big trouble.
[1] Just in case anyone here doesn't know and couldn't guess, a
determinist would say the experience of freedom is an illusion, and
doing other than you're told just involves a slightly more complex causal
chain than doing exactly what you're told.
> > And are you actually suggesting that no neural causal chain can exist
> > between the auditory nerve and the activated brain areas because the
> > chain actually goes through the self instead? Do you think that's
> > plausible? (Or even comprehensible?)
> >
> Between the efferent and the afferent (perception and action) areas,
> the information is indeed processed in the associative cortex, and
> the physical (objective) analogue of the subjectively perceived self
> would indeed be found flitting about in the dynamically recursive
> pattern-configurations and elsewhere, such as in the raphe and
> reticular actiating systems.
So is that a causal chain or isn't it? (Please give your reasoning.)
I'll take this opportunity to say that I won't be responding to any of
the slew of posts you just generated, aimed at me, related to religion.
(And I'm sure it was purely coincidental that that slew followed so
closely on my statement to Vincent that I wouldn't be pursuing the
religion thing.)
-- Robin Faichney Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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