RE: Toggling nature's auto-erase

From: Vincent Campbell (v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk)
Date: Fri Mar 16 2001 - 13:49:23 GMT

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    From: Vincent Campbell <v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk>
    To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    Subject: RE: Toggling nature's auto-erase
    Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2001 13:49:23 -0000
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    > <<Brodie's Level 3 begins there, then goes on to state that one
    > should choose in what to believe, regardless of its truth, based
    > upon its usefulness to oneself, and continue to believe it only so
    > long as it is useful. I have not achieved that ability to believe my
    > own lies when I know that what I'm telling to myself are
    > pragmatically chosen lies, nor do I wish to achieve such a
    > hypocritical condition. Once one begins lying to oneself, and
    > begins to accept that lying to oneself for selfish social, political or
    > economic reasons is OK, it becomes shamefully (or shamelessly)
    > easy to lie to others, a Nietszchean observation concerning a basic
    > principle underlying the proliferation of ridiculously irrational beliefs
    > and belief systems, literal christianity chief among them.>>
    >
            <There are plenty of beliefs that are neither "truth" nor "lie."
    Many of
    > these can be broadly categorized as attitudes. Others are labels or
    > distinctions. Choosing not to believe a truth is rarely useful, but
    > choosing
    > among attitudes and labels is immensely so.>
    >
            I think you need to explain this a bit more Richard. All beliefs
    are consequential, to greater or lesser degrees. Perceptions of beliefs as
    truth or lies have particular consequences, and so do attitudinal states
    towards beliefs. Can you give examples of what you mean?

            We must not forget the environment in which our beliefs and
    attitudes exist, which continually exerts pressures on us to change/reaffirm
    our beliefs and attitudes- pressures of events, but also of other people's
    beliefs and attitudes, and there are many feature of social psychology that
    show our tendencies towards social conformity. Add in, as we've discussed
    before, the unequal distribution of cultural and economic captial, and you
    find few but (relatively) wealthy, educated people are in a position to pick
    and choose their attitudes and beliefs. In this context, I think Joe's
    statement holds true in that there is a risk that those with choices lie to
    themselves that most of people's problems can equally be made by personal
    choice, rather than social change.

            Vincent

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