Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id JAA24354 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 1 Feb 2001 09:17:51 GMT Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2001 09:12:16 +0000 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Labels for memes Message-ID: <20010201091216.B1239@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <20010131194359.C541@reborntechnology.co.uk> <JJEIIFOCALCJKOFDFAHBCEKDCDAA.richard@brodietech.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.12i In-Reply-To: <JJEIIFOCALCJKOFDFAHBCEKDCDAA.richard@brodietech.com>; from richard@brodietech.com on Wed, Jan 31, 2001 at 12:40:05PM -0800 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Wed, Jan 31, 2001 at 12:40:05PM -0800, Richard Brodie wrote:
> Robin,
>
> <<what exactly
> is the point of saying, when that information is in a brain it's a meme
> but when it's encoded in behaviour it's not?>>
>
> There are some hidden assumptions in your question. I do not believe that
> memes can be encoded in behavior in all cases. I do not believe that it is
> necessary to the memetics model to assume that they can be.
Don't make the mistake of seeing media and artifacts as anything other
than recorded behaviour. Or if that's not what you're doing -- what
else is there?
> << Only sufficient information to allow
> perfectly complete recreation of a ballgame is the same as that ballgame.
> The reason we say that behaviour encodes memes, is that it allows
> imitation (recreation) of THE SAME behaviour.>>
>
> So a recipe is the same as a cake?
Obviously not. Disregarding the limitations of analogies, the point
is that behaviourally-encoded memes allow recreation of THE SAME
behaviour. The information required is all there.
> And I don't know who "we" is other than
> you.
You certainly know that Tim takes substantially the same view. Joe also
indicated recently that he goes along broadly with the "memes are external
AND internal" theme. There are others, around here and elsewhere.
> <<Just as an insect grub has different properties from the adult form.
> But they're the same insect, as we see when we take the long view.
> Adult->grub->adult is a recognisable cycle, and when we think of the
> insect in broad terms, it's the cycle that includes both forms that we
> think of. Brain->behaviour->brain is the corresponding cycle for memes,
> and when we think of a meme, unless for some particular reason we're
> focusing on a particular stage, it should be the whole cycle we have
> in mind. Otherwise, we don't have the full story.>>
>
> This is your personal theory, but there are many other ways for memes to be
> transmitted other than this cycle.
Such as?
> <<But behaviourally-encoded memes have the ability to get into the brains of
> observers! And that is exactly equally important. What you're saying is
> like "grubs aren't really important, that's just the intermediate stage".
> You're asssuming that what interests you is all that matters. You need
> to step back, be more objective. If the behaviour isn't interesting
> enough to be watched and remembered, it has no chance of being repeated.
> Its ability to get into a mind is perfectly complimentary to the
> brain-encoded form's ability to get out again, into behaviour. There is
> absolutely no way you can say one of these abilities is more important
> than the other. Are chickens more important than eggs?>>
>
> I have said several times that I don't think memes are the most important
> thing to study in cultural evolution. I think mind viruses are.
That wasn't my main point, and I'm happy to let it go. What interests
you most isn't my concern here. What is, is this...
> All I'm
> doing is guarding the definition of the word "meme" to mean mental
> replicators.
I have tried to explain that I'm not interested in extending the use of
"meme", that these same entities have to be encoded in behaviour, that
this is the only coherent way to explain their transmission. You have
denied that, but you have yet to offer any detailed argument to support
your denial.
> [RB]
> > But a meme is substantial. In fact, one of the most interesting things
> about
> > a meme is how many copies of it there are in different minds.
>
> <<Memes are no more substantial than words. As for the notion that many
> copies = substantiality -- words fail me.>>
>
> You misunderstood my point. The meme's existence in a particular mind is
> what makes it substantial, not the number of copies of it.
What I meant by "substantial", in the passage you are responding to
at [RB], which was edited out, was actually physical. Memes are not
physical things in themselves, just patterns, configuration of things.
As such, it is silly to insist that such patterns be given one name in
one context, and another elsewhere, especially when their existence in
either location is absolutely dependent on their existence in the other!
They don't get into brains unless observed in behaviour, and they can't
get expressed in behaviour without having resided in the relevant brain.
And the complexity covered by "behaviour", including as it does all media
and artifacts, is irrelevant to this account of the basic principles.
-- Robin Faichney robin@reborntechnology.co.uk=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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