RE: Labels for memes

From: Richard Brodie (richard@brodietech.com)
Date: Wed Jan 31 2001 - 20:40:05 GMT

  • Next message: William Benzon: "Re: Labels for memes"

    Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id UAA22453 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 31 Jan 2001 20:42:28 GMT
    From: "Richard Brodie" <richard@brodietech.com>
    To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    Subject: RE: Labels for memes
    Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2001 12:40:05 -0800
    Message-ID: <JJEIIFOCALCJKOFDFAHBCEKDCDAA.richard@brodietech.com>
    Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
    X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
    X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
    X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook IMO, Build 9.0.2416 (9.0.2911.0)
    X-Mimeole: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.00.3018.1300
    In-Reply-To: <20010131194359.C541@reborntechnology.co.uk>
    Importance: Normal
    Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk
    Precedence: bulk
    Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    

    Robin,

    <<what exactly
    is the point of saying, when that information is in a brain it's a meme
    but when it's encoded in behaviour it's not?>>

    There are some hidden assumptions in your question. I do not believe that
    memes can be encoded in behavior in all cases. I do not believe that it is
    necessary to the memetics model to assume that they can be.

    << Only sufficient information to allow
    perfectly complete recreation of a ballgame is the same as that ballgame.
    The reason we say that behaviour encodes memes, is that it allows
    imitation (recreation) of THE SAME behaviour.>>

    So a recipe is the same as a cake? And I don't know who "we" is other than
    you.

    <<Just as an insect grub has different properties from the adult form.
    But they're the same insect, as we see when we take the long view.
    Adult->grub->adult is a recognisable cycle, and when we think of the
    insect in broad terms, it's the cycle that includes both forms that we
    think of. Brain->behaviour->brain is the corresponding cycle for memes,
    and when we think of a meme, unless for some particular reason we're
    focusing on a particular stage, it should be the whole cycle we have
    in mind. Otherwise, we don't have the full story.>>

    This is your personal theory, but there are many other ways for memes to be
    transmitted other than this cycle.

    <<But behaviourally-encoded memes have the ability to get into the brains of
    observers! And that is exactly equally important. What you're saying is
    like "grubs aren't really important, that's just the intermediate stage".
    You're asssuming that what interests you is all that matters. You need
    to step back, be more objective. If the behaviour isn't interesting
    enough to be watched and remembered, it has no chance of being repeated.
    Its ability to get into a mind is perfectly complimentary to the
    brain-encoded form's ability to get out again, into behaviour. There is
    absolutely no way you can say one of these abilities is more important
    than the other. Are chickens more important than eggs?>>

    I have said several times that I don't think memes are the most important
    thing to study in cultural evolution. I think mind viruses are. All I'm
    doing is guarding the definition of the word "meme" to mean mental
    replicators.

    [RB]
    > But a meme is substantial. In fact, one of the most interesting things
    about
    > a meme is how many copies of it there are in different minds.

    <<Memes are no more substantial than words. As for the notion that many
    copies = substantiality -- words fail me.>>

    You misunderstood my point. The meme's existence in a particular mind is
    what makes it substantial, not the number of copies of it.

    ===============================================================
    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Jan 31 2001 - 20:44:25 GMT