Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id OAA01239 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 10 Oct 2000 14:45:53 +0100 Message-ID: <2D1C159B783DD211808A006008062D3101745A8C@inchna.stir.ac.uk> From: Vincent Campbell <v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk> To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Subject: RE: mysticism etc Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2000 14:43:20 +0100 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Hi Douglas,
Interesting comments these, and I'd endorse the view that there's an
inherent problem over the individual/collective question, which I think is
central to the memetic question. On the one hand people are talking about
individuals' brain/psychological processes, and on the other collective
behaviours.
>This does not impugn your argument, but there is an Orthodox Jewish
group, in
>Israel, that believes that the state of Israel is a blasphemy and
that the
>solution to the 'problem' is to give Israel back to the
Palestinians without
>conditions. The basis of their belief is that only God can give
Israel to the
>Jews and Israel was the wilful creation of Zionists.
I didn't know about this group, very interesting. How does the established
Jewish faith regard this people?
>I would classify this data that is contrary to your general
proposition as
>reflecting a problem of descriptive inadequacy that affects some
areas of
>academic thought, particularly my own field of law.
Of course law is fraught with the problems of trying to come up with
operational absolutes to use in practice e.g. the recent high profile
siamese tiwns case in the UK.
>On a similar, if more theoretical point, the way that questions of
subjective
>perception, or the phenomena of seeming objective data, or 'facts,'
are
>addressed in Western academic thought, are largely founded on what,
in western
>terms, are uncontested views of the distinction between the
individual and
>collective. The problem is that if you are attempting to
construction a
>universal theory, applicable to all human beings, differences in
the way
>different cultures perceive individuality and society collectively
must be taken
>into account or, it should be admitted that the theory is
culturally grounded.
Agreed. In many ways what I've been arguing against is the notion of
individualism (and personal well being) in relation to the collective
consequences of individually held beliefs and practices.
>By way of example on this point I'd refer interested readers to a
Guardian
>article of 8 October 2000 p.10 (only because it is close at hand)
on wife-murder
>in Britain's Asian community. Veena Raleigh, an epidemiologist who
studies
>suicide amongst Asian women writes that, "A problem is that [Asian]
women have
>no self-identity. You are a mother or a wife or a sister. You are
never
>yourself." The same can be said of many Asian males, in Britain,
whose identity
>is similarly (but not identically) expressed by their social role -
father, son,
>brother. There is some level, I expect, at which the physical
brain processes
>in question are universal. But the different attitudes towards the
worth of
>western-style individuality (and its effects on society) reflect
very deeply
>embedded cultural assumptions. In law we talk sometimes about a
"grundnorm" or
>basic norm which authorises positive legislative and judicial
rules. Perhaps
>there needs to be a memetic hierarchy that begins with a
"grund-meme" that might
>refer to essentials such as conceptual individual-collective
duality broad
>enough to encompass the variety of balance that exist between its
two
>elements.
Again, agreed, and no doubt the article's tone suggest this
non-individualism as the core problem which reflects a Western focus on
individualism.
>I don't mean to suggest that these differences are a stark
positive/negative
>duality, but it seems clear there are fundamental differences from
one society
>to another in the subjective thought (not brain) processes by which
human beings
>differentiate between self and other. These differences will be
reflected in
>the way that different people interpret empirical phenomena. So
while there may
>be phenomena that can verifiably be said to be 'real', this is less
important
>than its social meaning. To say that one believes in 'facts'
suggests the
>question, 'which facts, why these and not others' because any
empirical data
>that is on the table is on the table for a reason and its presence
on the table
>excludes other empirical facts. The selection of facts is a
purposive
>interpretative act.
Well in the example you cite, the fact is that women are being killed by
their husbands. Whether its out of personal malice or a cultural belief
system that places less status on the life of women, what's happening is
incontrovertible. The question becomes through what framework do we judge
such behaviour? One that takes into account the rights of women or one that
doesn't?
>For de Saussure, a crucible was diachronic analysis. Just as there
are
>differences in 'space' between cultures, so there are differences
in time
>between cultures or within any culture. Western individuality
today is
>different that it was 100 years ago, for example parental
permission to marry.
>Also economic decisions have affect North American individuality -
for example
>the replacement of 'collective' orientated street railways (in L.A.
and other
>cities) in favour of individual orientated automobile transport.
There is a big
>enough individual/collective divide between the US (Anglo-saxon)
and Europe,
>before even considering Asian societies. Also, talk of
consciousness seems to
>implicitly refer to or suppose a single type of consciousness,
(male, aged 30??)
>whereas consciousness would appear to be different at different
stages of a
>human's life that distinctly relate to the person's relationship to
society.
>(recalling my memories of puberty, for which the scientific
explanation however
>empirically accurate, is inadequate for the subject experiencing
it). It seems
>unless fluctuating differences in the balance between individuality
and
>collective on these time-space lines can be accounted for (which
requires
>transcending them in some way?) it's not possible to create an
adequate theory.
Agreed on the US/Europe difference regarding individuality/ collectivity.
Your last point here kind of goes back to the discussion Kenneth and were
having a while back about taboos, and how at different points in history
some practices (e.g. homosexuality) have been either vilified or tolerated,
and what changes to allow for this attitudinal change in society.
Vincent
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