Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id SAA22134 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 2 Oct 2000 18:16:49 +0100 Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 14:36:02 +0100 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: the conscious universe Message-ID: <20001002143602.B1989@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <20001002123233.AAA20430@camailp.harvard.edu@[128.103.125.215]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i In-Reply-To: <20001002123233.AAA20430@camailp.harvard.edu@[128.103.125.215]>; from wade_smith@harvard.edu on Mon, Oct 02, 2000 at 08:32:32AM -0400 From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk> Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On Mon, Oct 02, 2000 at 08:32:32AM -0400, Wade T.Smith wrote:
> On 10/02/00 04:19, Robin Faichney said this-
>
> >My position: There is, and can be, no objective evidence for (or against)
> >consciousness, in individuals or in the universe, because it is entirely
> >subjective, a "matter of opinion" as opposed to one of fact, which is why
> >it is entirely legitimate to suggest that it be considered a universal
> >attribute, instead of inexplicably being located in some systems that
> >exceed some arbitrary degree of complexity.
>
> As a philosophical position, I see no reason to refute this. It is
> entirely legitimate within its space. So is Euclidean analysis in
> Euclidean space.
Of course, our present concepts might at some future point be considered
as limited as Euclidean ones now seem to us -- in fact, that's very
likely. If that's your only remaining criticism, perhaps we can move on?
-- Robin Faichney=============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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