Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id VAA07220 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 19 Sep 2000 21:08:03 +0100 Message-ID: <003c01c0227a$b6e52940$5321e7d8@proftim> From: "Tim Rhodes" <proftim@speakeasy.org> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Subject: Re: First Appearances Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2000 13:45:14 -0700 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 4.72.2106.4 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2106.4 Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Joe wrote:
<<< In what works do Aaron Lynch's L-meme and Derek Gatherer's
g-meme first appear? >>>
Hi, Joe! I first used the terms L- and G-memes over a year ago in the posts
I've copied for you at the bottom of this one.
To my knowledge neither Derek or Aaron have yet to adopt the g-meme/l-meme
terminology in there work. Lynch's "Thought Contagion" outlines his
arguments for what I've labeled the "L-meme" and Gatherer's paper "Why the
Thought Contagion Metaphor is Retarding the Progress of Memetics" [JoM-EMIT
vol. 2] covers why he sees what I call the "G-meme" approach as being more
constructive for data collection.
Meanwhile, I continue to see increasing utility in viewing memetic evolution
and diffusion as a twofold process. I've begun gathering stories of
situations in which the G-meme has become disconnected from its original
L-meme but continues to spread and flourish regardless.
The most interesting among these are cases to me are ones where the G-meme
shows great fecundity but only a tenuous connection to the original L-meme
for which it was intended to serve as a vehicle. Often in these cases the
original L-meme will fail to be passed down regardless of the successful
replication of the behavior (the G-meme). Moreover, we find that quite
often a new L-meme will be grafted onto the original behavior retroactively,
as an explanation for the now replicating behavior. In cases were the
G-meme shows high fidelity but the L-meme is unstable, we often get several
different variations of the meme coexisting in the environment, each with
different "explanations" reported as a justification for the replicated
behavior.
For memes transmitted linguistically I've lately been viewing the narrative
structures and forms in which the idea (the L-meme) is conveyed as the
corresponding G-meme. I find it fascinating reflecting on how the selection
pressures that act on the G-meme -- what it is that makes for good story
that gets itself retold again and again -- effects the L-meme riding along
with it. The nature of the packaging effects the content that can be passed
down through it.
I see a feedback loop where the shape and tone of the story effects the
content conveyed by it. The structure the G-meme is forced into by the
selection pressures of the narrative becomes itself a selection pressure on
the L-meme and the ideas conveyed. Overall successful linguistically
transmitted memes are those for which the G-meme and L-meme feedback into
one another in such a way as to create an overall stable, mutually
supporting structure.
The nature of the narrative form in large part dictates where these basins
of attraction will fall and, I believe, predicts in large part what overall
memes /can/ be successful when moving through these particular mediums.
-Tim Rhodes
p.s. First appearances of the terms "L-meme" & "G-meme" reposted:
-----Original Message-----
From: Tim Rhodes <proftim@speakeasy.org>
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Date: Friday, June 18, 1999 7:54 AM
Subject: L- and G-memes (was: Re: Measuring Memes)
Mario wrote:
>Tim wrote:
>> So, if I have all that right (?), you go on to see the relationship
>> between memes and brains to be similar to that before the
>> enclosed cell--where the encoded information doesn't need to
>> include instructions for its own replication because another
>> agency (the brain) takes care of that part of the process.
>
>I hardly can believe it, but finally someone seems to understand what I am
>trying to explain since a few years.
Well, it looks like you got a few of your memes replicated after all!
>Ideas do not replicate themselves. If they are replicated successfully,
>it is because they can rely on an already existing world of brains. Of
>course they can have characteristics which make them being replicated
>preferentially. Some nucleotides may have been replicated preferentially,
>for several different reasons. Jokes, good recipes, novel insights,
>intriguing hypotheses, ideologies confirming your self image or
>promessing eternal life, threatening and promessing chain letters all will
>be replicated easily.
>
>> Assuming I've understood all that correctly, my question is this: Do
>> we have any examples of kind of prebiotic situation you describe
>> from which we might be able to extrapolate (and possibly make
>> projections about) the evolutionary rates for the analogous memes?
>
>I am afraid I can't do so, also because I have problems in understanding
>the question.. What do you want to learn? Could you explain again?
I probably didn't put that as well as I could have. Let me try again.
If we see memes as akin to genes, we're likely to look to genetics
(population or otherwise) for mathematical models which we can use to apply
to the behavior of memes. Aaron and Derek may dispute exactly which of
these formulas to use or how to apply them, but their general usefulness
isn't really in question if you've already decided that memes are
replicators and involved in natural selection.
But if we see memes as something else, as information that is acted upon by
an external agency rather then just copying itself, do we need to use a
different set of equations? If, as you say:
"Present day culture (cultural selection) then is considered to be in an
earlier developmental stage than biology (natural selection), a stage which
is best compared with prebiotic chemical interaction at the time when
informational molecules (nucleotides) were developed."
Do we then have any examples of how evolution and selection would act in
that prebiotic state from which to model the actions of the non-autonomous
meme?
Is there enough difference between "evolution" (as in culture) and "natural
selection" (as in biology) for us to worry about that mis-match?
(Hmmm, I'm not really sure if that was any clearer or not...)
I'll tell you where I think I'm going with this. I have an idea which is
cooking away at the moment--although it's still quite half-baked--which sees
both the meme-in-the-mind and the meme-in-the-behavior/artifact as
equivalent; as two different manifestations of the same meme. Such that it
would be misleading to talk about either memes as being passed from
brain-to-brain using behaviors, or from behavior-to-behavior using brains,
since either view only covers one part of the story.
I'm using the following thought experiment:
Suppose we call both the instructions in the mind and the manifestations of
them "memes". But we still make a distinction between the two in regards to
how the meme can mutate and what types of selection pressures will act upon
it in either of those two forms. For simplicity sake, I'm going to call the
memes-in-the-mind "Lynch's memes" or L-memes and the
memes-in-behavior-and/or-artifacts "Gatherer's memes" or the G-memes.
(Despite that fact that this will probably result in shouts of disgust from
both Aaron and Derek. :-)
So, imagine that there can be no such thing as heredity between one L-meme
and the next. And equally, there is no real heredity between G-memes and
their descendants. But rather, that L-memes may be replicated (loosely)
into G-memes and that G-memes may, in turn, be replicated (equally loosely)
into L-memes. So that we can never say that a meme is "passed down", but
rather that in retains characteristics while undergoing a L-G-L-G-L-G
transcription.
Now, this might seem like a very small distinction, but I really don't think
it is. There'll be a whole different set of rules governing the
transcription of an L-meme into a G-meme than there would with be for
transcribing a G-meme into an L-meme. For instance, if an idea (an L-meme)
is changed into an action (a G-meme) the type selection pressures it
undergoes--which will relate to why that idea was chosen for enaction over
others--will be different than those in play when the witnessed action
becomes stored in anothers memory (as an L-type meme). In the later case,
issues of simple physical proximity, the focus of attention, or the seeming
similarity to other memes previously transcribed may play a greater role in
selecting which G-memes successfully make the change into L-memes than
vise-versa.
And in the same way, the types of variations or mutations that take place as
an L-meme becomes a G-meme will be different in kind from those that occur
as a G-meme becomes an L-meme. And these differences would also, therefore,
need to be acounted for in any future models of meme behavior.
>From this point of view--seeing the memes as the characteristics that
survive in different forms throughout the L-G-L-G (or for that matter
"G-L-G-L") process--any arguments about whether a meme resides in the brain
or is actually in the behavior, would appear similar to a debate about
whether the hydrologic cycle begins with mountain rains or ocean
evaporation. (And as such, ultimately just about as useful to boot!)
I also think this viewpoint has certain implications about fidelity though
the L-G-L-G cycle and what characteristics we should expect to see surviving
the process successfully. But my ideas in this area are still even more
rudimentary and less thought out than the mess I've presented you with
above.
-Tim Rhodes.
BTW, it's more than likely I've pilfered some or all of these ideas from
someone or from an article somewhere, but at the moment I can't remember
what or from where that might have been.
-----Original Message-----
From: Tim Rhodes <proftim@speakeasy.org>
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
Date: Friday, June 18, 1999 6:51 PM
Subject: Re: L- and G-memes
Chris Lofting wrote:
>I wrote:
>>I'm using the following thought experiment:
>>
>>Suppose we call both the instructions in the mind and the
>>manifestations of them "memes". But we still make a distinction
>>between the two in regards to how the meme can mutate and what
>>types of selection pressures will act upon it in either of those two
>>forms. For simplicity sake, I'm going to call the
>>memes-in-the-mind "Lynch's memes" or L-memes and the
>>memes-in-behavior-and/or-artifacts "Gatherer's memes" or the
>>G-memes. (Despite that fact that this will probably result in shouts
>>of disgust from both Aaron and Derek. :-)
>
>So we have a dichotomy of L/G where L is gene-like (genotype - the one) and
>G is expression-like (phenotype - the many) but you see them as 'the same';
>the distinction is made to ease the description process...hmm..sounds
>familiar... any undifferentiated form can be seen as a BOTH/AND form in
>that all possible expressions occur at the same time but interference
>determines what YOU perceive (which may be different to what I perceive).
Nope, I think you missed my point. I don't believe there is ANYTHING which
could fill the roll of the 'phenotype' for memes. The fact that there is
one meme in the brain and several outside it is not enough of a coincidence
to sway me. There may be one hen and several eggs, but that doesn't make
the eggs into "phenotypes".
>>So, imagine that there can be no such thing as heredity between
>>one L-meme and the next.
>
>...so every L is unique, a 'sudden manifestion', a sort of 'miracle'...
>'pure' randomness..
Nope, not even close.
Rather, each G-meme is created from an existing (or possibly re-combined)
L-meme. And each L-meme created out of exposure to a G-meme. Two
individual catalytic processes, each with its own properties.
>This is a mathematician's approach in that, taking lotto
>as an example, every draw is totally independent of all previous draws;
>context-insensitive.
Again, I think you may have misunderstood me.
>> And equally, there is no real heredity between G-memes and
>>their descendants.
>
>...what do you mean by 'no real heredity'? do you mean there are
>expressions linked to a L-G that is 'similar' to that of another L-G
>but this is coincidence?
I mean that that there is no germ line that flows from L to L or G to G
directly, as such. For example, let's use this progression:
L1-> G1-> L2-> G2-> L3-> G3-> L4-> G4-> L-5-> G5
In the above, L4 descendant of L3, but it is not it's "parent" in the
lineage. L4 is the "child," if you will, of G3. And both are decended from
G1. Between L1 and G5, I would claim that there have been 9 instances of
replication. Whereas most commonly held phemotype/memotype theories would
claim only 4 instances of replication took place.
(And that's a MAJOR difference once you start trying to apply some of the
maths to this process.)
>In dichotomous analysis one 'rule' we find is that the moment you
>make the distinction of an object, aka a whole, so a world of *internal*
>dependencies emerge in the form of conservation laws. These are
>invarient and being so would create patterns in each unique expression
>that would, under analysis, suggest some sort of 'link' between
>expression X and Y. This link is in the method of analysis, the
>objectification, and so not necessarily 'out there'...
I claim that memotype/phemotype distinction is a product of the "method of
analysis", if you would. And that there has yet to be a convincing argument
that it is actually "out there" where culture (and the meme) is concerned.
>>But rather, that L-memes may be replicated (loosely)
>>into G-memes and that G-memes may, in turn, be replicated
>>(equally loosely) into L-memes.
>
>This is standard dichotomy behaviour where one element can go through a
>transformation into the other element. For example, using the fermion/boson
>dichotomy, from bosons can emerge fermions and fermions can break-down into
>bosons...
>The template form is the object/relationships dichotomy, from relationships
>can emerge objects and objects can break-down into relationships... We can
>see your brain working here...!
I'm glad! At least those rusty old gears are still turning, at any rate...
>> So that we can never say that a meme is "passed down", but
>>rather that in retains characteristics while undergoing a L-G-L-G-L-G
>>transcription.
>
>If a meme is seen as an object (a noun) aka a tRNA sequence then the
>creation of that sequence comes from doing a cut'n'paste of relational
>sequences (verbs) aka DNA sequences.
As I said before, my knowledge of organic chemistry isn't all it could be,
but is there a set of acts of variation and selection (in a Darwinian sense)
that take place when the DNA "unzips" and another set of variations and
selections the occur as the halves are rebuilt into two new strands? If
not, I don't think that the process is similar to that which I've proposed.
[snip]
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