Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id RAA19559 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 31 Jul 2000 17:15:27 +0100 Message-Id: <4.3.1.0.20000731100506.02188420@popmail.mcs.net> X-Sender: aaron@popmail.mcs.net X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1 Date: Mon, 31 Jul 2000 11:11:39 -0500 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk From: Aaron Lynch <aaron@mcs.net> Subject: Re: memes in minds, or memes in media? In-Reply-To: <2D1C159B783DD211808A006008062D310174596B@inchna.stir.ac.uk > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
At 03:44 PM 7/31/00 +0100, Vincent Campbell wrote:
>Hiya everyone,
>
>I've just been catching up on the debate generated by Derek Gatherer's
>questioning of thought contagions, mind viruses etc. etc. on the journal's
>website.
Vincent,
We have already argued this subject on the memetics list until we were blue 
in the face long before you subscribed to the memetics list. Moreover, as 
the "What's in a Meme" article that Wade posted indicates, the word "meme" 
is now widely known to be both vague and the topic of definitional quibbles 
among academics. One can spend a lifetime quibbling and trying to clarify 
what one meant when one used the word "meme," or one can simply drop the 
term. And, as I have already explained, the 1997 OED definition does not 
correspond to how I thought I was using the term: in particular, I do not 
wish to discuss items that are already considered "an element of a 
culture," but rather, I wish to include the evolutionary epidemiology of 
ideas that have not yet gained that status and even ideas will always 
remain too tentative or to sparse to have that status.
Given what I consider the enormous discrepancies between what my own 1998 
paper said and what has been said about that paper at JOM, and the strident 
language accepted by reviewers and editors, one might take that as a hint 
that JOM was not a suitable journal for the publication of my 1998 paper.
The matter of where to publish particular papers, however, is a separate 
question from the matter of what terminology to use. The notorious 
vagueness and controversy surrounding the definition of "meme" suggests 
that using the term does considerable damage to the effectiveness of 
communication--far more damage than whatever benefit might be gained by 
having a short word. Notice that the main article in the August edition of 
Fast Company also avoids the term. If you academically study the media 
content of that particular journalism outlet, you might suspect that the 
problems with the word "meme" are becoming common knowledge. The low 
profile web piece on "What's in a Meme" alludes to the definitional 
vagueness and controversy, which can be seen as creating the communications 
imperatives for Seth Godin to invent his own term "ideavirus" for the high 
profile article. Godin is not the only one to take this decision: I have 
forthcoming papers that do not even mention "meme," using terms such as 
"thought contagion" and "evolutionary epidemiology of ideas" instead. 
Malcolm Gladwell also leaves the term out of _The Tipping Point_, and 
explains the decision on his web page by again citing the word's 
definitional vagueness.
Perhaps when "thought contagion," "ideavirus," "mind virus," etc. are used 
without calling them "memes," then even Derek Gatherer will have less 
reason to view them as "retarding the progress of memetics." I still don't 
expect my work to please everyone, though, and never have. I happen to 
think that there are cultural evolution phenomena that cannot be understood 
without consideration of brain-stored information, but I have no particular 
need to try to impose that view on others. If I am right about that, the 
only personal implication for me is that I will have the ability to achieve 
insights that are intellectually off limits to others. If I am wrong, the 
personal consequence is that I will either make mistakes that others 
didn't, block myself from having insights that others can achieve, or both. 
Those who do and do not wish to consider internal, brain-stored information 
can presumably get on with their work and show the relative merits of their 
premises.
--Aaron Lynch
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