Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id NAA03916 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 25 Jul 2000 13:41:57 +0100 Message-ID: <2D1C159B783DD211808A006008062D3101745957@inchna.stir.ac.uk> From: Vincent Campbell <v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk> To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Subject: RE: Memetics a pseudoscience? Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2000 13:39:40 +0100 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Bit of a hot potato this one!
I think most of the people dedicating time and effort to memetics are trying
to follow the processes and intentions of the scientific method.
If memetics appears pseudoscientific, it seems to me this is because we are
still stuck at the stage of explanation, such as what are 'memes'- cultural
artefacts and behaviours? tranmission of thoughts and beliefs? Both? Or
Neither? People clearly disagree here, as they do on the mechanism and
process (or processes) of memetics.
Until there is agreement here, there can be no agreement on what kinds of
predictions to make or test, or even if it's possible to test memetic
predictions.
What's interesting to me is the extent to which, despite this uncertainty
around the concept, some of its proponents make normative assertions about
what to do about memes. I have by no means read all of the key works (I'm
working my way through them slowly but steadily), and what I see are often
very different normative conclusions drawn from the idea of memes. To give
a few examples, Susan Blackmore's book, offers the view that memes are
inherently disruptive and cause all sorts of problems in our lives, and the
way out is to indulge in practices such as Buddhism. Richard Brodie (whose
book I'm going through at the moment) similarly regards memes as essentially
bad things that we have to train ourselves to aviod being dominated by.
Howard Bloom argues that in order for individuals and nations to survive and
thrive, people have to be as open as possible to new ideas and innovations
(arguing that isolationism and conservatism have been the death-knell for
previously dominant nations in the past).
As someone from the humanities/social science tradition, seeing such
normative comments isn't unusual, but given the desired scientific basis of
memetics, and the fundamental disagreements that exist within it, such
statements do seem out of place. I think this is, perhaps, where some
memeticists get ahead of themselves, and thus appear pseudo-scientific.
One major problem is also that memetics evidently cuts across all kinds of
disciplines, all with their own habitus, and the understanding of all sorts
of vitally important elements are therefore highly contested (one of my
favourites is the meaning of 'culture'). Indeed, the very reason I was
drawn to the topic, and this list, was that I was trying to find out if
anyone from the disciplines of media/mass communiction studies had gotten
involved in the topic. [Most memetics books/articles I've read are very
good on things like evolution, and evolutionary psychology, and very poor on
mass communication.]
So, for what it's worth, I think memetics is scientific in intent, if not
always in appearance.
Vincent
> ----------
> From: E.M.Recio
> Reply To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> Sent: Tuesday, July 25, 2000 7:19 am
> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> Subject: Memetics a pseudoscience?
>
> Hello all!
>
> I just have a quick thing to remark on as far as the progress of memetics
> is
> concerned. After reading Michael Ruse's paper ``Creation-Science Is Not
> Science'' he brought up a few points (derived from Thomas Kuhn presumably)
> defining Science (with a captial `s')
>
> What strikes me most odd is whether or not memetics would fall into
> pseudoscience range. However, even the demarcation of what /is/ science is
> arguable.
>
> The five points brought up by Ruse as to the ``characteristic features''
> of
> what we call science today are: explanatory, predictions, testability,
> confirmations, falsifications, and most importantly (IMO) tentativeness.
> If
> you are familiar with these characteristics of science (a la Ruse,) then
> you
> can skip to the bottom.
>
> A viable explanation is created when natural laws are established.
> Religious
> beliefs often allow for events to happen that defy natural laws. For
> example,
> some may call these events miracles; or other events like Catholicism's
> transubstantiation. Without the obedience of natural law, religion cannot
> beconsidered a science per se.
>
> Predictions may then be established based on the viable explanations
> presented. With natural laws nicely established, and an explanation as to
> what
> exactly happened, then one may go on a limb and predict what will happen
> with
> certainty. In addition to what will happen, you can then predict what has
> happened (in the past.)
>
> The previously made predictions could now be tested which is the most
> important front in science. This is the ability for the scientific
> community
> to verify the predictions and explanations for themselves. This allows for
> scientists to ``see for themselves'' the results of an experiment or
> theory.
>
> The scientist then looks for confirmation of his theory. In other words,
> he
> looks for positive evidence to support his theory. The evidence must be
> purely
> empirical and not circumstancial. A theory must be falsifiable. In
> addition to
> being confirmable, a theory must lay itself out the be able to
> be proven wrong. When a hole is found in the theory, ad hoc explanations
> that
> aren't consistent with the general theory,exposes it as weak, or even a
> non-science. This is the major difference between theory of relativity and
> Freud's pseudo-scientific psychology. There isn't enough empirical
> evidence in the universe to prove Freud's theories wrong; each piece of
> empirical evidence brought against Freud could be countered by an ad hoc
> ``patch''. Yet there is much empirical data to be brought against the
> theory
> of relativity (i am not arguing the validity of the theory of relativity,
> its
> outcome is irrelevant to my point here). In other words, it must be open
> to
> possible refutation.
>
> Science must also be tentative, it must be open to change and
> ``advances.'' A
> scientist must also be open to alter his theory, or ultimately reject it
> if it
> proves invalid. This implies a certain professionalism that ought be
> maintained. If an experiment cannot be reproduced, or is reproduced
> incorrectly a scientist must be professional enough to step up and say
> that
> this findings were wrong. On the flip-side it took the Catholic Church a
> long
> time to admit to the revolution of the heavens!
>
> The question is in what way (using these five aspects) are we pushing
> towards
> making memetics a science. Where have there beenmilestones, or set backs
> (read: redefinition of the meme by Dawkins.)
>
>
>
> Best Regards,
> Elmo Recio
>
> --
> Sociology and Philosophy student at Drexel Univ.
> Philadelphia, PA 19103; USA
> Email: polywog@drexel.edu
> Homepage: http://polywog.navpoint.com
>
> ____________________________________________________________________
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>
> ==============================================================This was
> distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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