Re: settings

From: joedees@bellsouth.net
Date: Wed 28 May 2003 - 22:32:02 GMT

  • Next message: Keith Henson: "Re: Polichak on memetics"

    > Joe wrote:
    >
    > > It is logically inconsistent to on the one hand, acknowledge
    > > that a set (thoughts) reside in the mind, and on the other hand,
    > > that a subset of that set (communicable thoughts) do not reside
    > > there.
    >
    > *set theory
    > n : the branch of pure mathematics that deals with the nature
    > and relations of sets
    >
    > <mathematics> A mathematical formalisation of the theory of
    > "sets" (aggregates or collections) of objects ("elements" or
    > "members"). Many mathematicians use set theory as the basis
    > for all other mathematics.
    >
    > Mathematicians began to realise towards the end of the 19th
    > century that just doing "the obvious thing" with sets led to
    > embarrassing paradoxes, the most famous being Russell's
    > Paradox. As a result, they acknowledged the need for a
    > suitable axiomatisation for talking about sets. Numerous
    > such axiomatisations exist; the most popular among ordinary
    > mathematicians is Zermelo Fränkel set theory.*
    >
    > - As I understand, pure mathematics is just that. Applying set theory
    > to any _process_ or aggregate of processes is, perhaps, a bit
    > specious, if not downright irrelevent. It is not a calculus.
    >
    > I do know I can describe the bricks in the sidewalk outside my
    > apartment building in terms of all kinds of sets- the set of bricks
    > with the manufacturing mark up, the set with the mark down, the set of
    > chipped bricks, the set of loose bricks, the subset of loose bricks
    > with the mark down, the subset of chipped bricks with the mark up, the
    > subset of loose and chipped bricks, etc.
    >
    > But, nothing about set theory will tell me a thing about the process
    > of laying bricks, or making bricks, or why bricks are here, or how
    > slippery they are when wet, and yet, there they are, and they got
    > there somehow. Furthermore, I doubt any application of set theory will
    > explain any facet of behavior, at all. Set theory is not a description
    > of physical processes, it's a math of after-the-fact relational
    > observations.
    >
    > And, nothing about set theory will tell us a thing about cognition, or
    > effectively elucidate consciousness, not as a process.
    >
    > Prove to us all that set theory is applicable to consciousness. What
    > rationale is there to demand that set theory is relevant to
    > understanding the cognitive process, or even the structure of thought
    > or the system of mind?
    >
    C'MON, Wade, bricks can be divided into red and non-red bricks, just as ideas/memories/thoughts can be divided into communicable and noncommunicable, and fruit can be divided intop oranges and non- oranges.
    >
    > - Wade
    >
    >
    >
    > ===============================================================
    > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    > For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
    >

    =============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



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