Re: transmission

From: Douglas Brooker (dbrooker@clara.co.uk)
Date: Sun 25 May 2003 - 18:16:40 GMT

  • Next message: joedees@bellsouth.net: "Re: transmission"

    Van oost Kenneth wrote:

    > ----- Original Message -----
    > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    > > Unless they're accidental, they are preceded by the internal, that is,
    > > cognitive, intention to perform.
    >
    > Yes, ...but no, the cultural/ social etc venue induced it/ commands and
    > demands that certain performances were/ are to be performed.
    > The internal cognitive intention you talk about can be/ is just a go-
    > between
    > so that the actual performances were/ are to performed as demanded to/ for.
    >
    > Cognitive intention is an on its tiptoe walking mechanism so that cultural-
    > venue- demands are/ were transmitted into actual performances.
    > The (f)act of intention is just a by- product of the cultural- venue mecha-
    > nism to get its message across.
    >

    Hi Kenneth,

    I am barging in here, but only wish to say something about intention. Intention is a theoretical concept. As a matter of theory it is an imputation of one 'Other' to another person's state of mind. It references the person who imputes the intention, not the person to whom it is imputed. I don't know that it is useful to talk about it because most often it seems the person who talks about the intention of another things they are talking about something real in the other other person when they are really talking about themselves.

    "internal cognitive intention" suggests that there are other forms of intention, such as "external cognitive intention" and so on. (external non-cognitive intention? internal pre-cognition intention?) The lack of precision in scholarly terms of art is a good measure of the wooliness of the underlying concept. How is intention of any kind different than, for example,
    "will" or "motive"? Intention is a 'Serbonian bog where armies whole have sunk'.

    My own evolving view here is that intention is a self-proprietary concept - only a Self can speak about one's own intention.

    If a scholar wants to talk about these things, the concept of "will" is available, something different than intention, and something than can be talked about with more descriptive accuracy.

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