Suicide - not Cui Bono but who puts up with it

From: Paul marsden (paulsmarsden@hotmail.com)
Date: Fri May 26 2000 - 08:09:57 BST

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    From: "Paul marsden" <paulsmarsden@hotmail.com>
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Suicide  - not Cui Bono but who puts up with it
    Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 00:09:57 PDT
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    >Because he's next going to ask you how drunk driving, chain smoking, and
    >suicide benefit the individual.
    >

    >Wrong again. I only want to know how it benefits YOU! :)

    One way that I think is useful to look at this is NOT as a question of
    benefiting individuals, groups of even theoretical clusters of information
    on genes (there is no direct feedback from behaviour to genes) - its how
    evolutionary processes TOLERATE over evolutionary time such traits

    For example in the case of suicide it follows from Hamilton’s Rule that
    negative selection pressures would only act upon traits that had a
    detrimental effect on inclusive fitness. Put differently, self-preservation
    is only adaptive in cases where there is some residual capacity to promote
    inclusive fitness. This means that selection would tolerate underlying
    suicide-enabling structures that were contingent upon being cued in
    circumstances where there was a positive or neutral effect on inclusive
    fitness. Specifically, deCatanzaro, myself and others (e.g. Buss 1999,
    Wright 1996) have suggested that suicide is coherent with selection under
    one or more of several specific circumstances.

            1. In individuals who have a direct reproductive potential (“residual
    evolutionary fitness”) of zero or less than zero, i.e. those who are past
    reproductive age. This is essentially an extension of the evolutionary
    conceptualisation of senescence (Medawar Williams 1957) which states that
    aging and death occur because of a build up of lethal or sub-lethal genes
    whose nefarious effects only manifest themselves after reproductive
    potential is exhausted, thereby having no effect on that potential. For
    suicide this means that a contingent trait enabling suicidality but
    manifesting itself only late in life would be tolerated by selection
    mechanisms. Thus, from a selectionist stance, one would expect suicide to
    be particularly and differentially prevalent in older age groups.
            2. In individuals whose continued existence would have a negative or
    neutral effect on inclusive fitness, i.e. those who have no dependent kin
    (e.g. are single and/or isolated) or are a burden to kin, (e.g. the infirm
    and/or elderly). More generally, the general rationale is that the
    probability of suicide should increase as the possibility of promoting
    welfare of kin wanes. This argument may be extended to deliberately risking
    one’s life insofar long as the probability of inclusive fitness enhancement
    of suicide multiplied by the relative increase in inclusive fitness is
    greater than the probability of fitness loss multiplied by the relative loss
    in fitness, then selection would tolerate and indeed favour suicide .

    Now of course for memeticists the callenge is to gain insights into a
    working hypothesis to account for *culturally* sepecified suicide
    Specifically, applying this selectionist rationale we might expect the
    ecology of suicide to be patterned by an increased likelihood of suicide in
    the following cases:
              1. In individuals who have a direct potential of reproducing the norms
    that describe the culture or sub culture in which they are embedded of zero
    or less than zero, i.e. those who are disenfranchised, socially isolated,
    and labelled as deviants; essentially those who own no means of
    sociocultural reproduction .
            2. In individuals whose continued existence would have a negative or
    neutral effect on inclusive sociocultural fitness, i.e. those who have no
    cultural offspring, or those that are a burden to their cultural relatives
    manifested perhaps in feelings of shame. The idea that the probability of
    suicide should increase as the possibility of promoting the welfare of
    cultural relatives wanes may be extended to risk taking behaviour that may
    enhance sociocultural fitness, such as suicide attempts resulting in
    increased attention and influence, or on the other hand, may result in
    death. As long as the probability of inclusive cultural fitness enhancement
    of death multiplied by the relative increase in inclusive fitness is greater
    than the probability of fitness loss multiplied by the relative loss in
    fitness, then selection would tolerate and indeed favour suicide. This
    provides a social logic for self-sacrifice, such as the case of war. From
    this perspective, it makes sense to risk my life for going into battle for
    the sake of in-group norms as long as the probability of my death has no
    nefarious consequences on the likelihood that the norms will be reproduced
    (cf. du Preez 1996).

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