Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id WAA29507 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 24 May 2000 22:40:40 +0100 Message-Id: <200005242138.RAA21744@mail4.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Wed, 24 May 2000 16:42:31 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger? X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Date sent: Wed, 24 May 2000 15:01:21 +0100
From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net>
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger?
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Joe -
As I said in an earlier posting, I am reading the paper you posted,
and I am finding it very
interesting. For example, I had never seen the distinction of making
tools that are mere
extensions of self and making tools that make tools. I find that a
convincing and useful
distinction that might go a long way. I wish I had known about it
before.
But I am so far uncomfortable with the notion of applying Godel's
logical notions of logical
systems to an understanding of consciousness. Pinker uses the
analogy of a computer when he
suggests that consciousness is just a type of monitor. Any PC has
these monitors. It's true that
these monitors are not entirely accurate because their very usage
distorts the event being
monitored, but they are nevertheless accurate enough in the
competition for life's necessities. As
one example, we know that one of the monitors in the upper cortex
that monitors probability of
events after the events have been processed somewhere in the
lower brain distorts the actual
probabilities quite a bit -- which is why only people with split brains
can accurately estimate
the probability of events. Nevertheless, given that the system
needs a monitor, the positive
outcome (rough estimation) evidently outweighs the negative (some
error). PC monitors also have a
certain amount of innaccuracy built in, but they are good enough
the purpose they were designed
for.
So what I am asking is Since computers have monitors, why not
brains? How does Godel's theory
apply to the monitor function of a computer program? He predicts
there would be some inaccuracies,
but that might be quite tolerable if the advantages are sufficient.
Joe: This goes to the problem of the necessity of postulating a
"little guy/gal in our heads" whose job it woold be to watch such a
monitor. Of course, such a homunculus would require a smaller
homunculus of its own, etc., and we fall into infinite regress. This
is why Cartesian Dualism fails.
>
If this or any question is better left until after I read your entire
article, than please
indicate that. These are just some immediate thoughts - I'll be
more complete later.
Joe: I'm looking forward to it.
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