Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id DAA20302 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 24 May 2000 03:46:36 +0100 Message-ID: <392AFBAD.E5DC2F27@mediaone.net> Date: Tue, 23 May 2000 22:44:13 +0100 From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; I) X-Accept-Language: en To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger? References: <200005240215.WAA19363@mail2.lig.bellsouth.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Joe -
Thanks for this and the other reply. It's a type of material I don't have much experience with, so
I will be reading it over the next week. It certainly seems like a creative approach, but I will
reserve judgement.
Have a good Mem weekend.
Chuck
"Joe E. Dees" wrote:
> Date sent: Mon, 22 May 2000 21:49:01 +0100
> From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net>
> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger?
> Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>
> >
> >
> > "Joe E. Dees" wrote:
> >
> > > Date sent: Mon, 22 May 2000 18:37:48 +0100
> > > From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net>
> > > To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> > > Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger?
> > > Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > "Joe E. Dees" wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Date sent: Mon, 22 May 2000 12:30:41 +0100
> > > > > From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net>
> > > > > To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> > > > > Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger?
> > > > > Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> > > > >
> >
> > Thanks for your thoughtful reply. I have some comments on it below.
> >
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > In sum, I am arguing that there has to be a monitoring mechanism that compares
> > > > > > and calculates our own individual interests and how that must wedged somehow
> > > > > > into cooperative activities.
> > > > > >
> > > > > But except for the higher apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans
> > > > > and gorillas), only humans can pass the mirror test of self-
> > > > > recognition (Social Cognition and the Acquisition of Self, Lewis and
> > > > > Brooks-Gunn, 1972), where the subjects are placed around mirrors
> > > > > until they are familiar with them, then a dab of red paint is placed
> > > > > upon their noses, and they are shown their mirror reflections.
> > > > > Lesser apes and other animals, attend to the paint on the reflected
> > > > > nose, treating the reflaction as an conspecific (an other of their own
> > > > > species), while adult apes, some human children past the age of
> > > > > 15 months, and all (except mentally challenged) human children
> > > > > past the age of 2 years reach for their own noses, demonstrating
> > > > > their understanding that the reflection is a reflection of themselves;
> > > > > a concept of self is necessary to such self-recognition. This test is
> > > > > a perceptual one, and takes place under the radar screen of and
> > > > > free from any interference from the semiotic constraints of human
> > > > > or animal communication forms.
> > > >
> > > > Joe -
> > > > I'm glad you brought this experiment up, because I have been thinking about it for the
> > > > last few months. I must say that I so far take the side of Pinker on this; I don't
> > > > think it necessarily shows anything about self consciousness.
> > > >
> > > I think that it conclusively demonstrates that the size/complexity
> > > quotient of lesser mammalian brains does not breach the godelian
> > > barrier beyond which recursivity permits the emergence of self-
> > > referentiality, hence self-consciousness, and that the brains of the
> > > great apes and of humans do indeed surpass that threshhold.
> >
> > All I can say is, "Sure, if you say so." The problem is, I don't know what godelian barrier
> > or recursivity means, much less how they are relevant. Would you like to elaborate or at
> > least give me a reference?
> >
> > Also, it does seem relevant here that the brains of social species are indeed larger - which
> > would seem to go along with what both of us are saying.
> >
> Godel's Incompleteness Theorem is perhaps the most significant
> mathematical proof of the 20th century. He proves that any
> system of sufficient complexity to permit recursion or self-reference
> is necessarily either incomplete or in some place incorrect. It is
> breathtakingly simple, and here is a linguistic synopsis.
>
> First, let us postualte axiomatic system A. All true statements
> reside within A, and only true statements are found there. Now, let
> us construct statement B. Statement B is a recursive or self-
> referential statement; it talks about itself, and what it says is "B is
> not an axiom of A." What has happened here? If we place B
> within A, then A contains the false statement that "B is not an
> axiom of A", but if we exclude A from B, then the statement that "B
> is not an axiom of A" is rendered true, and A does not comtain all
> true statements. B belongs either (neither inside nor outside A) or
> (both inside and outside A), and the paradox is unresolveable
> within axiomatic system A. In other words, B is undecideable, and
> the bottom falls out; mathematics is revealed as a Zen Koan.
>
> What does this heve to do with us? Conscious self-awareness is recursive
> and self-referential; it is consciousness of being conscious. Since
> we possess it, our brains, as physical instantiations of interrelated
> and systemic logical structures, have breached the Godelian
> complexity barrier. In this sense, we are both not and not not the
> world we perceive and in which we act, kinda like the Zen answer
> neti, neti (not this, not that). We are neither seamlessly blended
> with it nor nonrelationally bifurcated from it; our relationship with our
> environs constitutes a system, beneath or beyond the categories of
> unity and multiplicity.
> > > >
> > > >Are we to draw from this
> > > > experiment that because of an added visual marker the lesson that lesser apes and
> > > > other animals don't have a sense that their inner states of, say, readiness to do
> > > > something, are different? First, we don't know just how different that little spot
> > > > makes the image.
> > > >
> > > In either case. enough to detect it, for the spot is pointed to in any
> > > case, either in the reflection or on the self. To claim that it is not
> > > noticed
> >
> > I am not arguing that it is not noticed - to the contrary. I am arguing that it could have
> > much more salience than our intuition would indicate.
> >
> But what kind of salience besides self-reference would explain the
> differential reactions experimentally registered?
> >
> > > is to ignore the different but in each case existent
> > > behaviors exhibited towards it, by both the animals who consider it
> > > to be placed on a conspecific, and those animals and humans who
> > > realize that it has been placed upon themselves.
> >
> > > > What seems like a tiny distinction to us might appear huge to
> > > them. I
> > > > seem to remember vaguely how this kind of thing is a common feature of ethology
> > > > studies of recognition of others in the species.
> > > >
> > > That's exactly the thing. These lesser apes are recognizing those
> > > reflections as conspecifics and behaving towards them in
> > > instinctually circumscribed ways (for instance, baboons attacked
> > > their reflections). They are not recognizing them as reflections of
> > > themselves.
> >
> > Exactly - because "themselves" is defined according to the salience of certain
> > characteristics. For example, lets do a thought experiment. We invent a kind of digital
> > mirror that can represent us as a mirror does or dressed in all kinds of fantastic costumes.
> > Even some of our species might try to attack these latter images that seem to only want to
> > perfectly imitate us. That little spot on the nose might have much more salience than it
> > would appear to us.
> >
> I would like to see an experiment done where the movements on a
> screen were the same as those of the subject, but the form was
> different. This experiment was not possible in 1972, when the
> study was conducted, since we lacked the enabling technology
> which we now possess. However, they did have screens playing
> tapes of conspecifics, and even of the subjects themselves,
> performing different motions as a control. The addition which you
> suggest (and of which I had previously thought) would indeed
> logically complete the ensemble.
> > > >
> > > >Second, the lack of this ability
> > > > doesn't seem likely to me.
> > > >
> > > Those who, can recognize themselves in a mirror can still
> > > recognize others. It's not a matter of "instead of", but of "in
> > > addition to."
> > > >
> > > >Third, I would say that the best way to find the smoking
> > > > gun on this one would be to actually research the action of the brain itself with MRIs
> > > > and other tools.
> > > >
> > > I agree that further corroboration is always a useful thing.
> > > >
> > > >I would be quite surprised to find that animals don't have some
> > > sense
> > > > of self.
> > > >
> > > But an explicit and distinct self-identity? If you think that all
> > > animals possess this, you WILL eventually be quite surprised.
> >
> > You actually want to say they can't distinguish themselves from others and don't have self
> > monitors? I could say the same - YOU will be surprised. :) I think that you might have
> > trouble with this idea because you immediately think of the concept of self-identity in
> > human terms - language and all.
> >
> How far down the animal chain are you willing to go? Rats and
> shrews, for instance? Fish? Clams?
> > > >
> > > > In the mean time, perhaps you could give an alternate explanation of how social
> > > > animals calculate social behavior. I wonder if the ability to have empathy - so strong
> > > > in humans - could play a role. It seems to me that that is an important way in which
> > > > we interpret the motivations of others. And I wonder if empathy emerged because it is
> > > > more effcient than a program that relies on hard coded stimulus/response. Or perhaps
> > > > empathy is a better way to detect cheaters. I'd like your feedback with anything you
> > > > have to say on the subject.
> > > >
> > > I believe that a lot of such behavior is instinctual and innate; after
> > > all, different species manifest differing social behaviors.
> >
> > Of course - but what is the nature of the instinct. Pinker says that the reason we are so
> > flexible is not that we have less instincts, but that we have more. So what are the
> > instinctual components of social behavior.
> >
> This is indeed a hot cognitive debate (canalization vs. flexibility),
> but I see self-consciousness as the final programming, for with it
> we are basically programmed to be able to transcend our
> programming. Self-consciousness is the basis for both freedom of
> choice and the ability to create signification.
> >
> > > It can only
> > > emerge, however, when the ground conditions are met, which of
> > > course includes the presence of conspecifics.
> >
> > I would add here that survival depends on the ability to cooperate.
> >
> Cooperation and competition are co-primordial necessities. An
> interesting game-theoretical approach is to be found in THE
> EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION, by Robert M. Axelrod.
> >
> > > Much of it is
> > > learned (or at least the latent instinctual capacities are actualized)
> > > through play behavior and parental nurturing. Remember that
> > > empathy can perhaps develop prior to self-conscious awareness,
> > > since other-permanence towards the caregiver develops before both
> > > self-permanence and object permanence, which develop together in
> > > the human child.
> >
> > I'm not sure. I would think that empathy depends on an already stable platform of self.
> >
> I am presenting the Piagetian model (which was also the context in
> which Lewis and Brooks-Gunn pursued their studies). Further
> study in the area would be a good thing.
> >
> >
> > ===============================================================
> > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> > For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
> >
> >
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed May 24 2000 - 03:47:09 BST