Re: Why are human brains bigger?

From: chuck (cpalson@mediaone.net)
Date: Mon May 22 2000 - 21:49:01 BST

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    Date: Mon, 22 May 2000 21:49:01 +0100
    From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net>
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    "Joe E. Dees" wrote:

    > Date sent: Mon, 22 May 2000 18:37:48 +0100
    > From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net>
    > To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    > Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger?
    > Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    >
    > >
    > >
    > > "Joe E. Dees" wrote:
    > >
    > > > Date sent: Mon, 22 May 2000 12:30:41 +0100
    > > > From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net>
    > > > To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    > > > Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger?
    > > > Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    > > >

    Thanks for your thoughtful reply. I have some comments on it below.

    >
    > > >
    > > > > In sum, I am arguing that there has to be a monitoring mechanism that compares
    > > > > and calculates our own individual interests and how that must wedged somehow
    > > > > into cooperative activities.
    > > > >
    > > > But except for the higher apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans
    > > > and gorillas), only humans can pass the mirror test of self-
    > > > recognition (Social Cognition and the Acquisition of Self, Lewis and
    > > > Brooks-Gunn, 1972), where the subjects are placed around mirrors
    > > > until they are familiar with them, then a dab of red paint is placed
    > > > upon their noses, and they are shown their mirror reflections.
    > > > Lesser apes and other animals, attend to the paint on the reflected
    > > > nose, treating the reflaction as an conspecific (an other of their own
    > > > species), while adult apes, some human children past the age of
    > > > 15 months, and all (except mentally challenged) human children
    > > > past the age of 2 years reach for their own noses, demonstrating
    > > > their understanding that the reflection is a reflection of themselves;
    > > > a concept of self is necessary to such self-recognition. This test is
    > > > a perceptual one, and takes place under the radar screen of and
    > > > free from any interference from the semiotic constraints of human
    > > > or animal communication forms.
    > >
    > > Joe -
    > > I'm glad you brought this experiment up, because I have been thinking about it for the
    > > last few months. I must say that I so far take the side of Pinker on this; I don't
    > > think it necessarily shows anything about self consciousness.
    > >
    > I think that it conclusively demonstrates that the size/complexity
    > quotient of lesser mammalian brains does not breach the godelian
    > barrier beyond which recursivity permits the emergence of self-
    > referentiality, hence self-consciousness, and that the brains of the
    > great apes and of humans do indeed surpass that threshhold.

    All I can say is, "Sure, if you say so." The problem is, I don't know what godelian barrier
    or recursivity means, much less how they are relevant. Would you like to elaborate or at
    least give me a reference?

    Also, it does seem relevant here that the brains of social species are indeed larger - which
    would seem to go along with what both of us are saying.

    >
    > >
    > >Are we to draw from this
    > > experiment that because of an added visual marker the lesson that lesser apes and
    > > other animals don't have a sense that their inner states of, say, readiness to do
    > > something, are different? First, we don't know just how different that little spot
    > > makes the image.
    > >
    > In either case. enough to detect it, for the spot is pointed to in any
    > case, either in the reflection or on the self. To claim that it is not
    > noticed

    I am not arguing that it is not noticed - to the contrary. I am arguing that it could have
    much more salience than our intuition would indicate.

    > is to ignore the different but in each case existent
    > behaviors exhibited towards it, by both the animals who consider it
    > to be placed on a conspecific, and those animals and humans who
    > realize that it has been placed upon themselves.

    >
    > >
    > > What seems like a tiny distinction to us might appear huge to
    > them. I
    > > seem to remember vaguely how this kind of thing is a common feature of ethology
    > > studies of recognition of others in the species.
    > >
    > That's exactly the thing. These lesser apes are recognizing those
    > reflections as conspecifics and behaving towards them in
    > instinctually circumscribed ways (for instance, baboons attacked
    > their reflections). They are not recognizing them as reflections of
    > themselves.

    Exactly - because "themselves" is defined according to the salience of certain
    characteristics. For example, lets do a thought experiment. We invent a kind of digital
    mirror that can represent us as a mirror does or dressed in all kinds of fantastic costumes.
    Even some of our species might try to attack these latter images that seem to only want to
    perfectly imitate us. That little spot on the nose might have much more salience than it
    would appear to us.

    >
    > >
    > >Second, the lack of this ability
    > > doesn't seem likely to me.
    > >
    > Those who, can recognize themselves in a mirror can still
    > regognize others. It's not a matter of "instead of", but of "in
    > addition to."
    > >
    > >Third, I would say that the best way to find the smoking
    > > gun on this one would be to actually research the action of the brain itself with MRIs
    > > and other tools.
    > >
    > I agree that further corroboration is always a useful thing.
    > >
    > >I would be quite surprised to find that animals don't have some
    > sense
    > > of self.
    > >
    > But an explicit and distinct self-identity? If you think that all
    > animals possess this, you WILL eventually be quite surprised.

    You actually want to say they can't distinguish themselves from others and don't have self
    monitors? I could say the same - YOU will be surprised. :) I think that you might have
    trouble with this idea because you immediately think of the concept of self-identity in
    human terms - language and all.

    >
    > >
    > > In the mean time, perhaps you could give an alternate explanation of how social
    > > animals calculate social behavior. I wonder if the ability to have empathy - so strong
    > > in humans - could play a role. It seems to me that that is an important way in which
    > > we interpret the motivations of others. And I wonder if empathy emerged because it is
    > > more effcient than a program that relies on hard coded stimulus/response. Or perhaps
    > > empathy is a better way to detect cheaters. I'd like your feedback with anything you
    > > have to say on the subject.
    > >
    > I believe that a lot of such behavior is instinctual and innate; after
    > all, different species manifest differing social behaviors.

    Of course - but what is the nature of the instinct. Pinker says that the reason we are so
    flexible is not that we have less instincts, but that we have more. So what are the
    instinctual components of social behavior.

    > It can only
    > emerge, however, when the ground conditions are met, which of
    > course includes the presence of conspecifics.

    I would add here that survival depends on the ability to cooperate.

    > Much of it is
    > learned (or at least the latent instinctual capacities are actualized)
    > through play behavior and parental nurturing. Remember that
    > empathy can perhaps develop prior to self-conscious awareness,
    > since other-permanence towards the caregiver develops before both
    > self-permanence and object permanence, which develop together in
    > the human child.

    I'm not sure. I would think that empathy depends on an already stable platform of self.

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