Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id XAA01774 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 22 May 2000 23:40:05 +0100 Message-ID: <3929706C.98955E59@mediaone.net> Date: Mon, 22 May 2000 18:37:48 +0100 From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; I) X-Accept-Language: en To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger? References: <200005222113.RAA01126@mail4.lig.bellsouth.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
"Joe E. Dees" wrote:
> Date sent: Mon, 22 May 2000 12:30:41 +0100
> From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net>
> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger?
> Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>
>
> > In sum, I am arguing that there has to be a monitoring mechanism that compares
> > and calculates our own individual interests and how that must wedged somehow
> > into cooperative activities.
> >
> But except for the higher apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans
> and gorillas), only humans can pass the mirror test of self-
> recognition (Social Cognition and the Acquisition of Self, Lewis and
> Brooks-Gunn, 1972), where the subjects are placed around mirrors
> until they are familiar with them, then a dab of red paint is placed
> upon their noses, and they are shown their mirror reflections.
> Lesser apes and other animals, attend to the paint on the reflected
> nose, treating the reflaction as an conspecific (an other of their own
> species), while adult apes, some human children past the age of
> 15 months, and all (except mentally challenged) human children
> past the age of 2 years reach for their own noses, demonstrating
> their understanding that the reflection is a reflection of themselves;
> a concept of self is necessary to such self-recognition. This test is
> a perceptual one, and takes place under the radar screen of and
> free from any interference from the semiotic constraints of human
> or animal communication forms.
Joe -
I'm glad you brought this experiment up, because I have been thinking about it for the
last few months. I must say that I so far take the side of Pinker on this; I don't
think it necessarily shows anything about self consciousness. Are we to draw from this
experiment that because of an added a visual marker the lesson that lesser apes and
other animals don't have a sense that their inner states of, say, readiness to do
something, are different? First, we don't know just how different that little spot
makes the image. What seems like a tiny distinction to us might appear huge to them. I
seem to remember vaguely how this kind of thing is a common feature of ethology
studies of recognition of others in the species. Second, the lack of this ability
doesn't seem likely to me. Third, I would say that the best way to find the smoking
gun on this one would be to actually research the action of the brain itself with MRIs
and other tools. I would be quite surprised to find that animals don't have some sense
of self.
In the mean time, perhaps you could give an alternate explanation of how social
animals calculate social behavior. I wonder if the ability to have empathy - so strong
in humans - could play a role. It seems to me that that is an important way in which
we interpret the motivations of others. And I wonder if empathy emerged because it is
more effcient than a program that relies on hard coded stimulus/response. Or perhaps
empathy is a better way to detect cheaters. I'd like your feedback with anything you
have to say on the subject.
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon May 22 2000 - 23:40:36 BST