Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id OAA25414 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Fri, 25 Jan 2002 14:11:47 GMT Message-Id: <200201251407.g0PE7VS21224@sherri.harvard.edu> Subject: Re: sex and the single meme Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2002 09:07:08 -0500 x-sender: wsmith1@camail.harvard.edu x-mailer: Claris Emailer 2.0v3, Claritas Est Veritas From: "Wade T. Smith" <wade_smith@harvard.edu> To: "memetics list" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 01/25/02 02:09, Joe Dees said this-
>Howzabout the term 'possible memes"? They become actual when they are
>actually replicated.
Well, I suppose the unhardened and unglazed clay in the kiln is a
'possible pot', so, sure, possible memes. And, yes, they become actual
(and deserve an actual name) when they get produced, and, in order to be
a meme at all, replicated.
In the brain, lots of things are happening. But, as of yet, we aren't
trying to call a specific process anything other than a process,
although, certain areas of the brain have been recognized as performing
somewhat usual and expected processes. But claiming that the teeming
activity of the brain is the activity of memes, well, it smacked, to me,
of precociousness on an extreme level. Memory is certainly a good source
of heat in the meme kiln- but, what are the chemical glaze constituents,
and the placement criteria? What catalysts are used and where and when?
Lots of things happening in the brain. Calling them all memes, well, that
also seemed like the logical course of having internal memes at all, as
well as mistakenly grouping experiential and specifically disjoint
processes under one rubric.
Aaron's definition, is, however, workable. Memes are memory items. That's
specific enough to let them be agents of and players in behavior, but
not, at present knowledge, specific enough to tell us where and when and
how they lodge in the brain or affect behavior.
The external stance simply lets the brain do what the brain does, in all
its complexity and mystery, and, when behavior (so far, human behavior),
produces a quantum unit of culture, and that quantum unit tunnels over to
somebody else, and they produce a quantum of culture that's highly
similar to the extent of being undifferentiable, that's a meme.
(Doing the cultural cataloguing, well, that's another kettle of fish. The
manuscript is not the galley proof, and the galley proof is not the book,
after all....)
What's happening in the brain might even be very similar in both or all
parties to this exchange, but, without knowing more, that's only enough
to say we have similar kilns, at similar temperatures, with similar clay
formulations, with similar glazes and catalysts applied. As any potter
knows, what comes out of the kiln is always, in many particulars,
unknown, even surprising, even while being carefully planned.
- Wade
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