Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id BAA04668 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 16 Apr 2001 01:33:50 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Sun, 15 Apr 2001 19:36:26 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: Determinism Message-ID: <3AD9F83A.19424.EAC46D@localhost> In-reply-to: <002201c0c600$c65c20c0$5eaefea9@rcn.com> X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 15 Apr 2001, at 19:06, Aaron Agassi wrote:
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2001 6:10 PM
> Subject: Re: Determinism
>
>
> > On 15 Apr 2001, at 17:56, Aaron Agassi wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
> > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
> > > Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2001 5:23 PM
> > > Subject: Re: Determinism
> > >
> > >
> > > > On 15 Apr 2001, at 5:42, Aaron Agassi wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Since I hold Superdeterminism necessary and sufficient for
> > > > > freedom, my position, precisely, is that omniscience would
> > > > > narrow down choices to the one optimal decision. Never the
> > > > > less, this would be, indeed, empowering, of course.
> > > > >
> > > > Such as which one of the two perfectly suited values one should
> > > > use to solve a given quadratic equation? Degrees of perfection;
> > > > hmmm. Perhaps you're ready to count fractal iterations of angels
> > > > on the heads of pins.
> > > >
> > > I have already answered that for you:
> > >
> > > An omniscient mathematician would not only have every sufficient
> > > answer to the equation, but would also predict every real world
> > > ramification of the choice. Which value takes up less space on the
> > > black board. Which value helps the best illustration of the
> > > principle under examination. Which response will be deemed
> > > cleverest to impress that cute mathematician of the appropriate
> > > sex. And so on.
> > >
> > But the only condition set was "which solved the equation." Your
> > other ones are being pulled out of thin air.
>
Yes, it is. The ONLY stipulation was a value that would solve a
particular equation, and there are two. Any other stipulations are
being made up by you and do NOT apply to the proferred example.
>
> In reality, every choice has ramification beyond the intended
> application. Especially in hindsight, the closest thing we have to
> omniscience.. So, no, it's not out of thin air. > > > > But if it
> there ever could be such a situation where further narrowing > > down
> of the correct response would make no difference, then, > > obviously,
> that residual choice which makes no difference would > > scarcely
> further empower. And the choice, however arbitrary, would > > still be
> determined, by whatever criteria of preference or whatever > >
> process. > > > In other words, even though you do not and cannot know
> a priori > that the choice of one perfect equal over another is
> causally > determined (from the first flush of the newly born Big
> Bang), you > nevertheless have an unshakeable faith that it must be
> so. How > touching.
>
> Superdeterminism is still the most elegant of the known competing
> hypotheses from the available evidence. And so, I would choose the
> explanation consistent with superdeterminism.
>
I gather that you consider superdeterminism to be either your free
choice, in which case your actions deny your words, or a
nonchoice determined in the fires of the Big Bang, in which case
your words mean nothing, since their zombic puppet typer cannot
be said to mean anything, and cannot even be said to be
consciously self-aware, since such an epiphenomenon would make
no difference in your actions, and considering any reasonable
application of statistics, such a property world not obtain, since it
could not have evolved in the absence of an ability to make a
selectional difference.
>
>I merely demonstrated
> that there was explanation consistent with superdeterminism, and that
> the hypothesis of superdeterminism is therefore internally consistent.
> Even under the a priori questionable hypothetical circumstance you
> pose, Joe Dees, that of different causes (the choices among adequate
> answers to the quadratic equation) with no different consequent
> effect, what so ever.
>
There is no superdeterministic explanation for one choice over the
other in the quadratic equation example, no explanation of
evolutionary efficacy, none of Godelian self-referential complexity,
complete with recursive feedback loops, none for those pesky P-E
pairs or for brownian motion, and so on.
>
> Indeed, if there is a process in the mind of any mathematician,
> omniscient or not, in choosing which of the adequate solutions to
> offer, or else failing to do so, then that, in and of itself, would be
> the causal effect of the different choices among the adequate
> solutions to the quadratic equation. Thus, there already can not be
> different causes such that these different causes will have different
> effect, neither separately nor in tandem. Because, even the choosing
> is causal, given causality at all.
>
See, there is another common error of yours; assuming the very
thing you purport to prove. This error has been considered logically
illegitimate since the beginnings of logic. You make up excuses
because you cannot deliver reasons, and circularly try to make
your conclusion into a self-justifying premise. Of course choosing
is causal; we are causal nexi. We are not just flat, featureless
streambeds through which your river of causality flows. There are
eddies in that current that recursively effect the stream, and thus
effect themselves recursively and complexly. Linear causality does
not possess the wherewithal to deal with this fact.
>
> Unless there is such a thing as Indeterminacy, which would be
> unnecessary and inelegant, and therefore nothing but unlikely argument
> from ignorance, far more so than the superdeterministic alternative
> remains most elegant among competing suppositional hypotheses.
>
You argue from ignorance that the unobserved nevertheless MUST
be there. The counterintuitive (to you) has a fine chance of being
correct; the simplest and most elegant is not always so (just as
Nietszche stated). For instance, Einsteinian physics is more
complex than Newtonian; it has to be, for it subsumes a greater
range of phenomena, and indeed subsumes Newtonian physics as
a special case.
>
> Because causality is observable, while the absence, as yet, of causal
> explanation in any given case simply does not constitute compelling
> evidence of it's absence. Indeed, is there even an hypothesis as to
> the nature of mythic Indeterminacy? Is it testable? And does any
> evidence better support Quantum Mechanics better than any alternative?
>
It is not observeable in every case, and unobserveability was not
compelling evidence of presence, the last time I checked. I say
that things are caused (by the definition we use of the term) where
they casn be observed to be, and where they cannot be observed
to be caused, one's judgment must be held in abeyance (as true
scientists do). You, on the other hand, assume the presence of
the unobserved. And the half-life breakdown rate of many isotopes
supports quantum mechanics, since it, like quantum mechanics, is
statistical, and does not constrain individual isotopic atoms. So
does brownian motion.
>
> The answer might be a resounding no, if, indeed, the measurement
> uncertainty held by Quantum Mechanics not to be truly measurement
> uncertainty at all (Ontological rather than Epistemological, the
> limits of measurability being explained by the hypothesis of
> Indeterminacy stating that causality is really statistical) can also
> be predicted otherwise. Such as, under Classical Physics and
> Thermodynamics under the science of Fisher Information, supporting
> assertion of the reality even of irretrievable physical information.
>
I have the book PHYSICS FROM FISHER INFORMATION: A
UNIFICATION by B. Roy Friedan, and the front flyleaf states that:
This book defines and develops a unifying principle of physics,
that of 'extreme physical information'. The information in question
is, perhaps surprisingly, not Shannon or Boltzmann entropy but,
rather, Fisher information, a simple concept little known to
physicists.
Both statistical [Joe - not the most superdetermined thing out
there; it makes no claims as to individual necessity, but the choice
to employ it is usually made because such individual causational
attributes cannot be fixed] and physical properties of Fisher
information are developed. This information is shown to be a
physical measure of disorder [Joe - not an auspicious concept for a
superdetermined universe, which would have to be absolutely
ordered], sharing with entropy the property of monotonic change
with time [Joe - unidirectional, from past to future]. The information
concept is applied 'phenomen-ally' to derive most known physics,
from statistical mechanics and thermodynamics to QUANTUM
MECHANICS [caps added], the Einstein field equations, and
quantum gravity. Many new physical relations and concepts are
developed, including new definitions of disorder [Joe - something
impossible in a superdetermined universe], time and temperatire.
The information principle is based upon a new theory of
measurement, one which incorporates the observer into the
phenomenon that he/she observes [Joe - in this sense, it is just a
generalization of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, not a
repudiation of it. It recognizes that there are untransgressable
limits to our ability to use matter/energy to measure itself, due to
the interactions between the tool and the object, and between
ourselves and the measurement. It is an unwarranted assumption
that there are exact states beneath the measurement uncertainty;
in fact, the 'electron' circling a hydrogen atom has a statistical
probability (and no certainty) of being at any specific location within
the shell it's 'revolutions' make]. The 'request' for data creates the
law that, ultimately, gives rise to the data [Joe - shades of wave-
particle duality here; the answer depends upon the question. It
also opens the door to feedback and recursion, which, unlike
causality, are nonlinear]. The observer creates his or her own local
reality [Joe - this is based upon the impossibility of observation
without interaction, and the alterations that come with it, but to
take it too literally leads one down the primrose path to solipsism].
>
> Because, all that would leave are certain phenomena the causes of
> which are still unknown. Phenomena that are only paradoxical assuming
> that everything else we know or think we know, is all completely true,
> so that it is nature which doesn't add up, not the state of the art in
> science. For nature to be static and provisional, rather than human
> understanding to be provisional in transition.
>
It's not a matter of provisionality with Heisenberg; those limits are
nontransgressable, period. The more precisely one determines an
electron's position, the less precisely one may determine its
momentum, and vice-versa; the two cannot simultaneously be
absolutely determined. Nature might very well add up, but
probabilistically. And the phenomena of which you speak (and of
which I have spoken) would only appear paradoxical given the
assumption of superdeterminism; in the absence of such an
assumption, we would be more willing to listen to the phenomena
speak - or be silent - for themselves as regards causation.
>
> It all boils down to the question of the burden of proof which in
> turn, inversely, becomes the question of the greater argument from
> ignorance.
>
The burden of proof of any assertion is upon the asserter; you have
asserted superdeterminism, and have not been able to (in fact,
theoretically, according to Popperian Falsifiability you cannot)
prove your case. I have presented counterexamples which you
have not been able to obviate, (you instead unwarrantedly assume
that an absence of evidence is evidence of presence) and as long
as those counterexamples remain valid and sound, the universality
of superdeterminism - and it's truth is inextricably bound to that
universality - is provisionally refuted. It thus remains an article of
faith, not of knowledge, which must be believed in, because it
cannot be known.
>
> And causality is observed, even if not universally. Because the
> cataloging of "white swans" is an endless process, until, if ever, the
> "black swan" of counter example refutation. While Indeterminacy is
> never observed. And unknown causes have been later discovered, while
> Indeterminacy has no basis save for currently unknown causes of
> unexplained effects. Indeed, Indeterminacy is not even a hypothetical
> "black swan", because it has no positive description or explanation,
> only that it would not be causality.
>
The absence of the invisible is as difficult to detect as its presence.
And of course indetrminacy is not observed, since it is the
absence of a property, and not its presence. To be Humeanly
technical about it, causality is itself never observed, only imposed
as an interpretation upon the succession of events. Let me remind
you that some attributed causes have also been subsequently
found not to be causes at all; that river flows both ways. And the
'black swans' are not theories, but the counterexamples to them;
thus, P-E pairs are one black swan, brownian motion another,
isotope breakdown a third and so on.
>
> That is why, currently, adherence to Indeterminacy makes the greater
> leap of faith.
>
No, refusing to embrace superdeterminism is simple a matter of being
honest with ourselves and others concerning what we do and do not know,
and innsome Heisenbergian cases theoretically never can know, and
refusing to mislabel assumption as truth.
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For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
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