Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id CAA27078 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Fri, 13 Apr 2001 02:55:11 +0100 From: <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2001 20:57:46 -0500 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: memes- remember them? Message-ID: <3AD616CA.30187.A68EE4@localhost> In-reply-to: <20010412104842.B1323@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <3AD4EEDB.28987.83E114@localhost>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Wed, Apr 11, 2001 at 11:55:07PM -0500 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.12c) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
On 12 Apr 2001, at 10:48, Robin Faichney wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 11, 2001 at 11:55:07PM -0500, joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
> > On 11 Apr 2001, at 15:36, Robin Faichney wrote: > > > Personally, if
> anyone cares, what I'm here for is to investigate the > > relationship
> between objective (deterministic) and inter/subjective > >
> explanations of behaviour. I'm sorry if that sounds pretentious, but
> > > it's the simple (or maybe not so) truth. Anyway, as I see it, > >
> memetics is very clearly on the objective/deterministic side, when > >
> taken to its logical conclusion, though as Richard Brodie has shown, >
> > the concept can be used humanistically too. > > > People may be
> memetically predisposed by their genes or
>
> I'll assume you mean people may have genetic behavioural tendencies
>
Or attitudinal ones, which can color their behavioral choices.
>
> > memetically influenced by their environment
>
> Here again I guess by "memetically" I guess you mean "behaviourally".
> I think it makes most sense to view memetic influences as a subset of
> environmental influences.
>
A subset that has things going on that are not going on in the non-
subset members of the larger set. I consider one's culture and
one's physical environment as differing, although intertwined. Other
people are seen and heard just like other, nonselfconscious
stimuli, but there is a subset present there that is absent from the
sound of a waterfall or the sight of a rock; intentional
communication from an other capable of bestowing meaning upon
being.
>
> > without necessarily
> > being memetically hardwired or memetically determined. It's not an
> > all-or-nothing proposition.
>
> In practice, that's obviously true. Theory, however, is not so easy.
> The only relevant theoretical stance I know that's not full of holes
> separates objective and inter/subjective explanations, which in
> practice are necessarily mixed. This is a "dual aspect" theory:
> objective phenomena are dealt with in one way (broadly) and
> inter/subjective ones in another, but these are considered different
> aspects of one homogeneous universe.
>
But there ARE NO purely objective phenomena; To be a
phenomenon is to APPEAR; and this requires that it appear to
someone, which makes it subjective, or to several someones,
which makes it intersubjective.
>
> The power of the free will and
> deterministic models of brain electrochemistry are seen as equally
> real, but so different in kind that to imagine conflict between them
> makes no more sense than to try to understand a game of chess in terms
> of the construction of the board and chessmen. Free will is analogous
> to the relative freedom of movement of the queen, and to try to
> explain it by considering the materials out of which the set is made
> is... well, it's obvious, I hope.
>
Free will can no more be explained by appealing to
superdeterminism than the choice of the person moving the queen
can be explained by reference to the wood of the board and the
pieces.
>
> Of course, there's absolutely no way you're going to take this on
> board, Joe, because you refuse to see the holes in your own stance[1]
> and so have no motivation seriously to consider any other. Pity.
> With your brains and your drive you'd be a real asset. Your
> commitment is the only problem, but it's fatal. Ho hum...
>
I could write the same paragraph concerning you, with the benefit
that, unlike when you address it to me, it would actually be valid.
>
> [1] Eg, how does the subjective phenomenon of willpower affect the
> objective phenomenon of neural activity? And "top-down causation" is
> no explanation -- even if causation across levels was accepted (though
> that's inherently contradictory), that would leave the mental/physical
> interaction problem, which defeated Descartes and defeats you.
>
Wrongo, boyo, because emergent mind is not a matter of two
previously unconnected or differently sourced things interacting, but
a matter of autochthonous mind - that which has emerged from the
neural substrate brain - both influencing and being influenced by its
material substrate, to which it is already connected, since it arose
from that substrate. Cartesian dualism this is NOT, but you are
unable to grok this single, simple fact.
>
> While
> for dual aspect theory, refusing to confuse subjective and objective
> phenomena and explanations, it's a lead pipe cinch.
>
You just do a modified behavioral thingy, where instead of refusing
to acknowledge the mind at all, as they did, you refuse to
acknowledge the interactions between emergent mind and the
materian substrate from which it arose, and perpetrate this by
appealing to 'objective phenomena', a phrase that is a
phenomenological contradiction in terms.
> --
> Robin Faichney
> Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
> (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 02:58:22 BST