Re: Determinism

From: Aaron Agassi (agassi@erols.com)
Date: Wed Apr 11 2001 - 07:41:35 BST

  • Next message: Aaron Agassi: "Re: Determinism"

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    From: "Aaron Agassi" <agassi@erols.com>
    To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
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    Subject: Re: Determinism
    Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2001 02:41:35 -0400
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    ----- Original Message -----
    From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 2:13 AM
    Subject: Re: Determinism

    > On 9 Apr 2001, at 12:36, Aaron Agassi wrote:
    >
    > >
    > > ----- Original Message -----
    > > From: <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    > > To: <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    > > Sent: Monday, April 09, 2001 4:59 AM
    > > Subject: Re: Determinism
    > >
    > >
    > > > On 5 Apr 2001, at 8:36, Robin Faichney wrote:
    > > >
    > > > > On Wed, Apr 04, 2001 at 08:55:38PM -0400, Aaron Agassi wrote:
    > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > Free choices being subjective, then, do not
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > contradict with
    > > > > > > > > > objective
    > > > > > > > > > > > > > determinism.
    > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > You got it!
    > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > > Now all we have to do is get it clear that
    > > > > > > > > > > > > subjectivity is not
    > > > > > > > > > generally
    > > > > > > > > > > > > inferior (or superior) to objectivity.
    > > > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > > What ever are you talking about?
    > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > > Again, I have to spell it out: despite being
    > > > > > > > > > > subjective, freedom
    > > > > > is
    > > > > > > > just
    > > > > > > > > > > as real as -- something real.
    > > > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > > Where does superiority or inferiority come into it?
    > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > > Illusions are generally considered inferior to real
    > > > > > > > > phenomena.
    > > > > > > > >
    > > > > > > > I don't understand.
    > > > > > >
    > > > > > > Don't you prefer reality over dealing with illusions?
    > > > > > >
    > > > > > Preference is another question.
    > > > >
    > > > > I don't think it's entirely rational either, but you'll find
    > > > > there's quite a widespread preference for objectivity over
    > > > > subjectivity.
    > > > >
    > > > Which is quite strange, considering that objectivity is
    > > > unattainable; the best we can do is intersubjective agreement.
    > >
    > > Never the less, we still seek to improve our knowledge of truth
    > > (correspondence to reality). And besides subjectivity, there is also
    > > relativity. And the question remains whether subjective freedom is
    > > illusory or simply relative to the subjective frame of reference, thus
    > > as objectively real as superdeterminism, globally.
    > >
    > Much realer,

    No, only more immediate and vivid. And that IS entirely perceptual.

    >since we all personally, phenomenologically
    > experience our apodictically self-evident freedom, while only some
    > of us hypothecize and conjecture that they might be deluded as to
    > their own experience's facticity. To even label such a conjecture
    > as objectively real

    No hypothesis is real (except to the extent that such an hypothesis itself
    may have, indeed, been actually hypothesized), only, possibly, true
    (corespondent to reality).

    >(as if it were absolutely proven

    Another question entirely.

    Besides, as Einstein demonstrated, proof only exists in Logic and
    Mathematics. In all post priori questions, the best that may be had is
    evidentiary support.

    >- something that
    > can never happen for a positive universal empirical truth-claim,
    > since it violates Popperian falsifiability)

    Not so. Only one contrary example constitutes falsification.

    >is much worse than simply
    > logically incorrect; it is absurd and nonsensical on its face.
    > >
    > > > > --
    > > > > Robin Faichney
    > > > > Get your Meta-Information from http://www.ii01.org
    > > > > (CAUTION: contains philosophy, may cause heads to spin)
    > > > >
    > >
    > >
    > >

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