Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id PAA14285 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 8 Apr 2001 15:09:31 +0100 X-Originating-IP: [209.240.220.151] From: "Scott Chase" <ecphoric@hotmail.com> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Determinism Date: Sun, 08 Apr 2001 10:05:24 -0400 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed Message-ID: <F152MzfoV1qdiixjnzi0000107e@hotmail.com> X-OriginalArrivalTime: 08 Apr 2001 14:05:24.0532 (UTC) FILETIME=[F4DCD740:01C0C034] Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
>Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>Subject: Re: Determinism
>Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2001 09:40:01 +0100
>
>On Thu, Apr 05, 2001 at 08:06:17PM -0400, Scott Chase wrote:
> >
> > >On 04/05/01 09:03, Chris Taylor said this-
> > >
> > > >Actually this is worth asking: Is there anyone on this list who
>doesn't
> > > >think that a brain composed of neurons, interacting through
>electrical,
> > > >chemical and mechanical routes only, is enough to make a mind?
> > >
> > >Yup. Me.
> > >
> > >If it ain't in a human body, we have no proof that it's possible. I do
> > >happen to think that the 'brain in a box' hypothesis is bogus. The mind
> > >has fingers and toes and eyes and ears.
> > >
> > I suppose you're not intrigued by the plot of that wondrous Berkeleyian
>(the
> > idealist not the university) movie _The Matrix_?
>
>I very much enjoyed that film, but no way is it "Berkeleyian". People are
>fed a false reality, but there is a real reality out there. (Otherwise
>there couldn't be a false one, could there?)
>
It's been a while since I read Berkeley, so I'm hesitant to go out too far
on a limb, but I did get the impression that you could co-opt his arguments
for God as the Mind which generates our reality with an argument based on a
virtual reality generating computer "mind". For Berkeley, to be is to be
perceived (*esse is percipi*). For some to exist, it must be generated by a
mind, based on the argument that we can't distinguish objects from ideas.
Berkeley cannot be acccused of solipsism is that the reason thing do not
cease to exist when we close our eyes is that they are being generated in
the mind of God. Again, substitute a computer in the place of God and IMO
you end up with _The Matrix_.
Added to Berkeley would be Schopenhauer's modification of Kant's
phenomenal/noumenal distinction by hybridizing it with the web of Maya ala
the Vedas. The computer network ("web") in _The Matrix_ generates a Mayan
veil of illusory appearance. Only a few actually manage to wake up and
experience the *ding in sich*.
Maybe I'm shoehorning idealism where it don't belong....
>
> > I grant that I'm probably
> > not having my thoughts and perecptions generated by a computer, but the
> > argument does set a neat little contrast with other views. I'm not
>formally
> > acquainted with the B.I.V. argument, but have caught snippets in
>neverending
> > threads on usenet.
>
>You may or may not consider it significant that in The Matrix, these are
>not disembodied brains in vats, but complete people.
>
What use is their body when they are plugged into the "reality" generating
network? They might as well be a brain.
>
>But even where
>an actual brain is in a vat, I'd suggest that, given sufficient input
>*and* output, with feedback (so what I do affects what I see), and social
>interaction through that mechanism, a mind could develop. It's not the
>actual physical body that's required, but all the experience it gives us.
>
Yep.
>
> > I'd consider *my* car an extension of *me*. If a bird poops on *my* car,
>it
> > has in essence pooped on *me*. I wonder if my mind inteacts with my car
>in
> > some strange way.
>
>Why "strange"? Surely your mind interacts with your car in very
>straightforward ways. But we need to distinguish direct interaction,
>e.g. when driving, from phenomena like the sense of ownership, for
>which direct interaction probably isn't actually required, though I'm
>sure it helps. As regards identification (poop on my car, poop on me),
>the object of it need not even exist. "I am spiritually an Atlantean!"
>Though that probably applies to the sense of ownership too. "You
>should see my beautiful unicorn! Unfortunately, he's invisible."
>
Cars are extensions of our "egos" or become integral components of our
"selves". I also ponder how we get so used to typical driving actions like
shifting with a clutch that these actions become second nature and we almost
interface with the car to a point where there is a blending. The car's
exterior becomes a second skin. A pressure dent becomes an unsightly scar.
Negotiating traffic is like walking through a crowded mall.
>
> > Would one's personal diary be a compoent of their mind? Can a mind be
> > partially offloaded onto other media? Those tought might not be easily
> > recollected several months later unless ecphorized by the cues in a
>diary.
>
>Absolutely. Any scrawl on the back of an envelope is a memetic
>download/backup.
>
>
And there's nothing mystical inherent in writing.
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