Re: ....and the beat goes on and on and on...

From: Douglas Brooker (dbrooker@clara.co.uk)
Date: Sat Jan 20 2001 - 09:10:30 GMT

  • Next message: Aaron Agassi: "Re: ....and the beat goes on and on and on..."

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    From: Douglas Brooker <dbrooker@clara.co.uk>
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    Aaron Agassi wrote:

    > Heck, Chris Lofting, do tell, will you acknowledge Ontology, objective
    > reality, at all?
    >
    > If truth is possible, then the refinement, as you put it, may be productive.
    >
    > If there can be any such thing as truth, then the next question is whether
    > there can be knowledge of any truth (correspondence to reality).
    >

    About 100 years ago the meanings of 'objective' and 'subjective' became
    inverted. (Except in common law jurisprudence) What we now describe as
    'objective' would before the change have been referred to as 'subjective'.
    Considering that shifting meanings of words is a messy business, there had to
    have been a theoretical point where both 'objective' and 'subjective' meant the
    same thing! Sort of like when the North and South pole swap polarity - is it
    every 25,000 years or so? This also makes me think of how the left-right
    orientation of some written languages in the Levant became inverted about 3,000
    (?) years ago. "|_" for example, became "_|".

    Truth is also very problematic in legal theory. Some aspects of the 'truth'
    problem in law elude legal scholars. The elusive aspects are those most embedded
    in cultural values, and so taken for granted. Attitudes towards truth (and the
    concept of the State) are a usually undiscussed subtext or much legal theory.
    It is very difficult to see in oneself, until you experience a culture where
    these values are absent or different. De Tocqueville wrote that there are some
    truths about themselves that Americans can only learn from others (i.e. aliens -
    used here in its U.S. legal sense). Legal scholars are trained in the law of a
    specific jurisdiction, Germany, USA, etc, but come to legal theory as if there
    was a very general something called 'Law' which their local
    jurisdiction-specific training made them qualified to speak about. In one
    sense, their training does, but behind this training are 100s of years of
    accumulated cultural values. The relationship between legal expression and
    these values is notoriously absent from the culture of law school. Lawyers
    aren't trained in this kind of self awareness.

    Culturally conditioned attitudes towards truth in jurisprudence are one of the
    values neglected in legal education. European Civilian theorists speak of law
    assuming truth is an absolute. European litigation is a search for this truth,
    an inquisition led by the judge, and consequently the litigants have a less
    important role to play in this inquest than in common law systems. Legal truth
    in litigation in common law systems pursues a more relative truth, or 'parties'
    truth' - litigants offer up to the court their versions of truth (and challenge
    each others) and this in most cases is all that the court is permitted to work
    with.

    Both systems work very nicely (theoretically) at the local level. The problem
    I study is what happens when the two competing truth orientations of common law
    and civil law meet in legal theory, where scholars from both systems speak about
    big L law without taking into account their different attitudes towards the
    nature and role of truth in law. Whether its Civilians like Luhmann or Kelsen,
    or Common law writers like Dworkin or Hart, both create a big L Law, as a
    universal that essentially is just a more abstract version of their own local
    system and far from universal. That's what I'm seeing alot of here.

    When someone speaks about truth and correspondence to reality, it seems it's
    time to put on the anthropologist's pith helmet and get out the note book and
    start asking questions about everything except truth and its correspondence to
    reality.

    Douglas

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