Re: DNA Culture .... Trivia?

From: Robin Faichney (robin@reborntechnology.co.uk)
Date: Fri Jan 19 2001 - 10:41:09 GMT

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    Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2001 10:41:09 +0000
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Re: DNA Culture .... Trivia?
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    In-Reply-To: <200101182005.PAA02168@mail4.lig.bellsouth.net>; from joedees@bellsouth.net on Thu, Jan 18, 2001 at 02:11:16PM -0600
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
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    On Thu, Jan 18, 2001 at 02:11:16PM -0600, Joe E. Dees wrote:
    > >
    > All I have seen you do is deny - deny that people possess selves,
    > or that memes possess meaning.

    I have explained to you several times that I only deny the self when
    arguing with anyone who insists that the term has a concrete, unequivocal
    referent. Otherwise, I say the concept is useful in some contexts and
    not in others. I have also explained to you, very recently, in this
    thread, that our disagreement on the meaningfulness of memes was about
    the use of the word "meme", ie semantics. I have ALSO gone as far as to
    admit, since that disagreement, that for a while I did over-emphasise
    the objective aspects of memetics and memes and neglect the subjective
    and intersubjective aspects. Will you EVER admit ANY of your mistakes?
    Or isn't your sense of self strong enough?

    > > > There should be no confusion between the molecular
    > > > significance we can grant to the structure of a material (or an
    > > > energy) and the communicational significance we impose upon
    > > > certain configurations or patterns of one substance or another.
    > > > There isn't with me.
    > >
    > > Nor with me. Why do you think there is?
    > >
    > The answer was in reference to the second quote, which you
    > snipped, about the difference between the information contained in
    > the writing on the paper and the information contained in the
    > structure of the paper, which Dennett urged his colleagues not to
    > consider at that time.

    Why do you think that to consider the relationship between these two
    types of information is to confuse them?

    > > Your problem, Joe, is that you're so busy arguing, you don't get around to
    > > listening. The best possible encapsulation, or least lossy compression,
    > > of my work is "to prove Dennett's supposition correct". Now tell me
    > > either why you object to _that_, or what more you would need to know
    > > before formulating your objections.
    > >
    > Mind is composed of matter/energy configured in sufficiently
    > complex, dynamic and recursive patterns to permit it to breach the
    > Godelian barrier and impose meaning. There; I've done it for you.

    I'm sorry. Maybe I'm too stupid to understand, but I'm sure someone
    around would benefit, if you just say a little more about how that
    statement proves correct the supposition "that some concept of
    _information_ could serve eventually to unify mind, matter, and meaning
    in a single theory."

    -- 
    Robin Faichney
    robin@reborntechnology.co.uk
    

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