Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id BAA18682 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Tue, 16 Jan 2001 01:56:00 GMT Message-Id: <200101160153.UAA03658@mail0.lig.bellsouth.net> From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 19:59:02 -0600 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Subject: Re: DNA Culture .... Trivia? In-reply-to: <20010115131438.A3878@reborntechnology.co.uk> References: <B68741F9.690F%bbenzon@mindspring.com>; from bbenzon@mindspring.com on Sun, Jan 14, 2001 at 11:46:03AM -0500 X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Win32 (v3.01b) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Date sent: Mon, 15 Jan 2001 13:14:38 +0000
To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Subject: Re: DNA Culture .... Trivia?
From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
> On Sun, Jan 14, 2001 at 11:46:03AM -0500, William Benzon wrote:
> > on 1/14/01 10:24 AM, Robin Faichney at robin@reborntechnology.co.uk wrote:
> > > Given Blackmore's commitment to Buddhism, I think it safe to assume she
> > > does NOT belong in that camp.
> >
> > Given her chapter on "Religons as memeplexes" in her book I'd say she pretty
> > much does.
>
> OK. It's been a while since I looked at the book, I've never read that
> chapter, and I forgot it existed. She obviously does not consider her
> favoured variety of Buddhism to be a religion. And to be fair, there
> is plenty of precedent for that sort of attitude. One of the first
> things I remember ever hearing about Buddhism was "it's not a religion,
> it's a philosophy".
>
I've heard Southern Baptists in the Bible Belt claim that they don't
have a religion, they have faith, and A faith (even THE faith). BTW,
Lynch has a lot in his book on religions as memeplexes, and
although he is not a priori hostile to them per se, I believe that this
is Brodie's outlook also.
>
> > > Of the others, Dawkins is the only one that
> > > I know does. But whatever, there is very little that can reasonably be
> > > considered "orthodox memetics" --
> >
> > Yeah, I'm no doubt over-stating my case. From my point of view, everyone
> > who believes in memes in the head is an orthdox memeticist. Of course,
> > that's a pretty large and diverse group of people. That means that Derek
> > Gatherer and I and a few others are not adherents to this bit of orthodoxy.
>
> Though I view memes as encoded both in brain states and in behaviours,
> I don't think I believe in what you call "memes in the head". I certainly
> don't believe that brain-encoded memes will ever be identified. The
> study of specific memes will always have to focus on behaviours and
> artefacts.
>
This is because every brain (hardware) is physically different, and
has different software (experiences) encoded in it, which means
that in each case, every new meme must accommodate itself to
and be assimilated by a different already existent gestalt, in a
differently configured environment. Thus the identical meme is
never stored in two brains in the very same place or configuration.
There are as many different ways for a single meme to be
represented in all the existent and possible human
brain/experience configuration/gestalts as there are possible
snowflakes in a hypothetical sky.
>
> > > that, surely, is one of its weaknesses.
> > > I'd suggest that you succumb to the temptation to take the worst as
> > > typical due to your anti-memetic prejudice. This is an extremely
> > > successful meme, to be found just about anywhere there's any prejudice,
> > > whatsoever, even when it means imagining concensus where there's none.
> >
> > I would suggest that before you make any more silly statements about why I
> > say what I do that you do me the courtesy of taking the time to read my
> > technical discussions of cultural evolution. I am certainly opposed to the
> > notion of memes in the head, but not to the idea of memes as such, and that
> > is the position I've taken in my published work. In particular:
>
> My mistake: instead of "your anti-memetic prejudice", I should have
> said "your attitude towards what you view as memetic orthodoxy". But the
> substance of what I said remains: the concept of memetic orthodoxy is
> highly dubious, at best.
>
There are at least three camps; the G memers (memes only
BETWEEN minds, in the world), the L memers (memes only
WITHIN minds), and the camp to whicch I belong, the G + L
memers (the life cycle of a meme involves both endocognitive and
exocognitive stages). For members of the third camp, it is as
impossible to understand how a meme could get mutated or
selected between minds as it is to see how it could get replicated
within one, and all of these are required for memes to evolve.
>
> > > By the way, as far as I'm concerned, that memetic way of talking is
> > > just that: a way of talking. At this level, that of the specific
> > > meme, it has no significant explanatory power. Much better, most
> > > times, to use psychology, etc. So I'm on your side in this. But the
> > > fundamentals of memetics are useful at a higher level of abstraction.
> > > It provides a way of thinking in objective terms
> >
> > In what way is loose talk "objective"?
>
> I didn't say "loose talk". I don't know where you got that from.
>
> > > about recurring patterns
> > > of non-genetically-determined behaviour. As far as I'm aware, there is
> > > no alternative to it, in this.
> >
> > You've got to be kidding. Do you really mean this? Or, rather, just what
> > do you mean?
>
> One of Dawkins' main motivations in bringing forward the concept was to
> account, in terms as "fundamental" as those of the principles of genetics,
> for behaviour that is not genetically determined. I believe that he
> succeeded -- in very broad terms, obviously -- and my main interest in
> memetics stems from that. However, you have to understand that this
> only works at a high level of abstraction. At that level, genes and
> memes between them account for all behaviour. But at lower levels,
> when you start to look at specific behaviours, you obviously have to
> take specific factors such as individual psychology into account.
>
> If you're one of those people who has no interest in such philosophical
> considerations -- maybe that's where "loose talk" comes from -- then
> that will mean little or nothing to you, and I would not waste my time
> in further discussion of this with you.
>
It is true that one cannot account for much human social and
cultural behavior be appealing to genetics (although evolutionary
psychology is correct that you can account for some of it). It is
hard to imagine how, in the absence of social/cultural learning,
which is itself memetic transmission, a born and raised feral child
could detest bowling, or hum beethoven's fifth, or favor conservative
fiscal policies and liberal social ones, or enjoy haiku and pastel
watercolors, or prefer paisley to plaid, all on the basis of a genetic
inheritance.
> --
> Robin Faichney
> robin@reborntechnology.co.uk
>
> ===============================================================
> This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
> Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
> For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
> see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
>
>
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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