Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id IAA02869 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 11 Jan 2001 08:45:05 GMT Message-ID: <A4400389479FD3118C9400508B0FF230010D1A12@DELTA.newhouse.akzonobel.nl> From: "Gatherer, D. (Derek)" <D.Gatherer@organon.nhe.akzonobel.nl> To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Subject: RE: DNA Culture .... Trivia? Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2001 09:40:47 +0100 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Derek: [yesterday]
You don't even know for sure if they [neural memes] exist at all.
Mark:
It's not difficult at all. All one has to do is follow genetic procedures,
population genetics to begin with, but neural research can be blended in
(as DNA research has been blended into genetics). It is the combination of
substrate and population research that produces powerful results.
Derek:
You'll need to be much more specific than that. I've been working as a
geneticist for 17 years now, and I just don't see that "All one has to do is
follow genetic procedures". What genetic procedures? I can't see that
population genetics leads us to neural memes. I worked in neurobiology
1992-1995 and again since 1999, and I can't see how "neural research can be
blended in". You need to give me a specific example, with empirical data,
of these "powerful results" you refer to. As far as I can see there are no
results at all in internalist memetics, much less powerful ones. I gave you
a specific example of how my version of memetics would work. I took a
hypothesis, some data, did a quantitative analysis and judged the hypothesis
in the light of the results. You need to show me that you can do the same
using your paradigm.
Mark:
Sure, one can count artefacts and behavior. Where is the meme, though?
Derek:
The artefacts and behaviours are the memes. They are the cultural
replicators.
Mark:
Counting artefacts and behaviors is a traditional activity, but few
practitioners of the art find it necessary to call their subjects memes.
Derek:
True, as Bill points out.
Mark:
The Lynch-meme paradigm allows one to call these artifacts and behaviors
memetic phenotypes. By studying population dynamics of these phenotypic
expressions, the patterns of memetic genotype replication can be discerned.
Derek:
But can they? You point out that there is no particular reason to call raw
anthropological data memes. Okay, fair enough, for the sake of argument
let's call them 'memetic phenotypes' as you suggest. One could call them
culture types, culturgens, cultural traits etc, as various people have done
in the past. The nomenclature is not a problem. What I dispute is that the
observation of such external visible things as culturgens etc implies,
necessarily or even plausibly, the existence of some corresponding 'memetic
genotype'. There are millions, literally millions, of different ways a
brain can produce one behaviour. There's absolutely no reason to assume a
'1 behaviour = 1 brainpattern' model.
Mark:
It's just like genetics.
Derek:
No, it's not. Trust me, I'm a geneticist.
Mark:
[the SOM] is an interesting example. What it has to do with a substrate
free meme
is less obvious. First, there is no mention of memes in the outline
provided, only a
discussion of beliefs and cultural activities. The term 'memetics' doesn't
occur until the last sentence when the example is labeled 'empirical
memetics' and the lack of any references to 'neural memes' noted. It would
have been more accurate to say there wasn't any mention of memes
one way or the other. This is basically the point Bill Benzon made in his
reply. People have been doing population studies like the above for years
and had no need for memetics. I don't know how you are going to involve
the substrate-free meme in this,
I would still like to know. I agree your example is a memetic case study,
but don't see what a substrate free meme does for anyone.
Derek:
2 suggestions on this score a) it frees from the necessity of spending the
rest of our lives looking for neural memes that don't exist, and b) it
integrates memetics into the mainstream of the social sciences. If
substrate-free memetics just ends up looking like anthropology, then that's
fine by me.
Mark:
For the neural meme brigade, the above is similar to the raw data Mendel
collected. It's a population study. It suggests a relationship between
environment and belief system. The data isn't random. The study suggests
there is a genotype-phenotype relation between the phenotypic cultural
behavior and the neural mechanics of the brain, the neural meme. As you
point out, we don't know 'why this is the case,' we have a reasonable
starting point for study, though. Neural mechanics.
Derek:
No, you misunderstand the nature of Mendelian genetics. Mendelian genetics
wasn't just about collecting populations studies of raw data. In fact, very
little raw population sampling was done at all. Mendel formulated a very
rigorous set of rules for determining what was and was not likely to be a
gene. As undergrads, we would sit in labs for weeks, literally, plating our
our Aspergillus, trying to determine if our phenotypes were true breeding
(ie. are they genetic at all), if they exhibited expected patterns of
segregation and assortment (ie. did they obey Mendel's first and second
laws) if complemented other mutants (ie. were they alleles of already
described genes). Mendelian genetics is a seriously tough quantitative
empirical discipline that allows you to get right down to the core of
heredity without even a mention of DNA. (the DNA is a bonus of course).
There's no way you can say, no way at all sorry, that memetics now is like
genetics was in the days of Mendel. There's just no comparison whatsoever.
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