Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id XAA19370 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 16 Nov 2000 23:59:15 GMT Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 15:56:12 -0800 Message-Id: <200011162356.PAA30384@mail22.bigmailbox.com> Content-Type: text/plain Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary X-Mailer: MIME-tools 4.104 (Entity 4.116) X-Originating-Ip: [209.240.220.189] From: "Scott Chase" <hemidactylus@my-deja.com> To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: RE: stored mental entities (and Mayr on memes) Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk('binary' encoding is not supported, stored as-is)
>Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2000 09:57:13 -0600
>To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>From: Mark Mills <mmills@htcomp.net>
>Subject: stored mental entities
>Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
>
>At 03:55 PM 11/15/00 +0100, you wrote:
>>Mark:
>>
>>What do you mean by 'stored mental entities'?
>>
>>Derek:
>>I thought that was your definition of the meme.
>
>Ok, so you used 'stored mental entities' to mean 'neural memes.'
>
If these "neural memes" are based on memory and the processes of encoding, storage, and recall within individual brains, what differentiates them theoretically from similar conceptions* such as mnemons or engrams as memory traces? BTW, in skimming Ernst Mayr's 1961 article "Cause and effect in biology" as it appears in _Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist_ (1988. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts) I notice Mayr employs the term engram when discussing open programs, learning and memory. As for Mayr's take on "memes" he touches on this topic briefly in this PNAS article:
Mayr E. 1997. The objects of selection. PNAS (94): 2091-4
which can be accessed here:
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/94/6/2091
Quoting Mayr on the meme: (bq)"It seems to me that this word is nothing but an unnecessary synonym of the term "concept"."(eq)
Would, following Mayr, conceptual evolution be preferable to memetic evolution?
>
>I think there is a subtle difference between 'mental entities' and 'neural
>entities.' I have no idea how one documents 'mental entities' in
>repeatable experiments. 'Neural entities' require repeatable experiments.
>
>I guess the focus on repeatable neural experiments allows me to ignore the
>'theory of mind' debate. I admit I have and use one, it just shouldn't
>blind me to the implications of repeatable neural experiments.
>
>
The problem is how a meme, engram, or mnemon can be detected within the workings of the mindbrain so that it can be studied as an observable phenomenon.
*- as a concept has the "meme" evolved in parallel to or from the "engram" or "mnemon" or other terms? What about the "collective representations" of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl? Are they conceptually homologous or analogous to "memes"? There are probably a fair number of terms to be found within the history and theory of diverse fields such as memory research and sociology which coincide with the "meme". What of this "meme" meme? ;-)
Scott
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