Re: the conscious universe

From: Joe E. Dees (joedees@bellsouth.net)
Date: Tue Oct 03 2000 - 02:31:50 BST

  • Next message: Robin Faichney: "Re: the conscious universe"

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    From: "Joe E. Dees" <joedees@bellsouth.net>
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Date: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 20:31:50 -0500
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    Subject: Re: the conscious universe
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    References: <20001001195133.AAA1511@camailp.harvard.edu@[204.96.32.187]>; from wade_smith@harvard.edu on Sun, Oct 01, 2000 at 03:51:38PM -0400
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    Date sent: Mon, 2 Oct 2000 09:55:33 +0100
    To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    Subject: Re: the conscious universe
    From: Robin Faichney <robin@reborntechnology.co.uk>
    Send reply to: memetics@mmu.ac.uk

    > On Sun, Oct 01, 2000 at 03:51:38PM -0400, Wade T.Smith wrote:
    > > Hi Robin Faichney --
    > >
    > > >Show me the flaw in my analysis.
    > >
    > > >My contention is that [something] is only evident in parts, but when
    > > >the [something] is fully analysed, it makes more sense to attribute it to
    > > >the whole.
    > >
    > > Show me what is useful in that statement.
    >
    > Assume, for the moment, I have never encountered a pencil before, never
    > heard or read anything about them, and do not know what they are for.
    > I can only see graphite at each end of this thing. Should I take the
    > skeptical position, and assume it exists only where I can see it? I say
    > no, the more elegant theory takes into account the fact that it looks
    > as if it might run throughout the length; I can imagine (very vaguely)
    > a straightforward manufacturing process to produce it in that form;
    > whatever it's used for, that would allow it to remain useful if it wore
    > down; and, finally, I have no reason to believe that the graphite does
    > not run through it. On the balance of probabilities, and assuming that
    > I can't actually lay my hands on it and break it to find out, I should
    > take it that there's just one piece of graphite, end-to-end. The
    > skeptical position is the less rational one.
    >
    > I'm suggesting that similar considerations apply to consciousness.
    > I might be wrong[1], but if you (or anyone else) thinks this suggestion
    > is simply silly, then you don't understand it.
    >
    > I'm not claiming to have originated this, by the way. It is known as
    > "panpsychism", and is discussed, for example, by Thomas Nagel in his
    > book Mortal Questions.
    >
    > [1] Actually, as the location of consciousness is not a matter of
    > objective fact, I can't be wrong (or right) about that, but I could be
    > wrong about the utility of taking this view.
    >
    Yeah, except for one small detail; the world isn't as uniform as the
    pencil. People and animals are experientially quite different to us
    from rocks and running water.
    > --
    > Robin Faichney
    >
    > ===============================================================
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    >

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