From: Dace (edace@earthlink.net)
Date: Fri 19 May 2006 - 19:50:06 GMT
Chris writes:
> Memes are not real. Species are not real. Even genes are not
> really real tbh. If there are exceptions to a concept, then it
> is flawed unless it is understood from the outset that it is a
> convenient 'model' or approximation, for the purpose of analysis.
It depends on whether or not the form of an object is intrinsic to it. For
atoms and organisms, the form is intrinsic. For dust and machines, the form
is either a random agglomeration or externally stamped onto it. So, for
instance, with a car, we could say the tires are not really part of the car
but constitute an intermediary between the car and the road. If it's
convenient for us to conceptualize it this way, we are free to do so. But
we can't say that feet are really just intermediaries between the person and
the ground because the form of a person is intrinsic, and that form includes
feet. Memes are not convenient concepts we devise but intrinsically formed
phenomena shaping human mentality.
Kate writes:
> > Because we traditionally
> > associate information with representation, we assume that physical
> > information contains representation as well. The physical existence of
> > representation never has to be demonstrated, instead being smuggled in
> > through the back door. This isn't so much science as a trick of the
mind.
> >
> . . . but I don't see why the physics-level description must always
> trump all others. So long as the letters exist on a page or screen, and
> there are people who can understand them, why doesn't it make sense to
> say that these letters represent information?
It makes perfect sense, which is why we do indeed speak that way. When it
comes to artifacts, including books, we speak the way that's most
convenient. We say there are words on the page because it's easier than
saying there are bits of ink stamped onto processed wood pulp. (And even
that's not correct since ultimately it's all just arrangements of atoms).
But striving for philosophical correctness isn't a very practical way to
express things. Unfortunately, our view of reality tends to reflect our
pragmatic way of speaking.
> Of course they lose that
> meaning when there are no human minds to interact with them, but that
> doesn't mean that they are 'meaningless' in the sense that an
> undiscovered boulder is meaningless.
The written word stimulates meaning when read because the writer has stamped
the correct form onto the page. Because its form is not intrinsic to it, a
word on a page has more in common with a rock than a word in the mind.
> >> when I hum a note, e.g. middle C, it does not feel intuitively as if I
> >> am representing information /about/ middle C. It feels like what I'm
> >> humming simply /is/ Middle C.
> >
> > Yes, because music is not a representational system but an aesthetic
system.
> > While a piece of music can represent many things, such as beauty or "the
> > cool" or any number of emotions, that's not really the point. It's not
what
> > a song means but where it belongs in our aesthetic system that's
important.
> > What makes a set of sounds "music" is that it functions in the context
of an
> > AS, just as what makes another set of sounds "words" is how it functions
in
> > the context of a linguistic RS.
> >
> I'm not sure that we can talk about an AS as being the same sort of
> thing as an RS. I agree that music does not truly 'represent' emotions
> (only evoke them in us), and I also see what (I think) you mean by a
> piece of music functioning in a certain context - there are different
> genres and styles of music - but I don't think that there is quite the
> same relationship there, as between a representation and the system from
> which it derives its meaning. Little children can imitate tunes and
> rhythms without being taught any sort of 'system', whereas they need to
> learn the RS of musical notation before they can do anything with even a
> single note written in that system.
That's because the AS is inborn, whereas the RS of musical notation must be
learned. However, the RS of conceptualization is also inborn, as is the
capacity to learn any other RS.
> > Is there a phenotypic manifestation of
> > the belief that the earth revolves around the sun? Well, if you're
building
> > a spaceship to Mars, this belief will make a difference, but in terms of
our
> > day to day terrestrial existence, it simply doesn't matter whether you
know
> > that the sun doesn't really rise and set. Such knowledge has no effect
on
> > how we live or feel. So I think a meme can stand on its own as a
replicator
> > without need for phenotypic accompaniment.
>
> Yes - but its content will always potentially have effects, in some
> contexts, and it is via these effects that it will be selected.
Not necessarily. It could be selected simply because it's true.
ted
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