RE: Philosophy of Technology: scale and meaning; sameness and dif ference part 1

From: Vincent Campbell (v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk)
Date: Fri Jul 14 2000 - 14:09:07 BST

  • Next message: Vincent Campbell: "RE: Memes and sexuality"

    Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id OAA10567 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Fri, 14 Jul 2000 14:11:01 +0100
    Message-ID: <2D1C159B783DD211808A006008062D3101745925@inchna.stir.ac.uk>
    From: Vincent Campbell <v.p.campbell@stir.ac.uk>
    To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk>
    Subject: RE: Philosophy of Technology: scale and meaning; sameness and dif ference part 1
    Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2000 14:09:07 +0100
    X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21)
    Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
    Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk
    Precedence: bulk
    Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    

    It's this bit that I don't agree with (sorry for just chucking the remark
    in, it was a bit knee-jerk, as I read through your posts):

            'all communciations have within them particular formations that are
    > encoded such that decoding is at a particular level and the data is not
    > necessarily 'meaningful' beyond/outside that level.'
    >
            Doesn't this suggest a fundamentality of meaning in any
    communication? Where's your evidence that this is the case?
            Does it apply to forms of symbolic communication (language, writing,
    art etc.)?

            As soon as a piece of information is communicated it is mediated, it
    stops being a pattern of neurological activity in a brain, and becomes
    gestures, words, pictures etc. In a mediated form, the exact meaning and
    intent of the person originating that information is changed in a way which
    allows differential decoding- indeed there are few guarantees that the
    information will reach the intended target in anything like the form
    intended (perhaps a bit like your posts to me :-)). Now, this system isn't
    entirely relative either, consensus can and does exist, but it is not fixed,
    and is still open to alternative intepretations.

            Terry Eagleton gives an amusing example of this in his 'Literary
    Theory: An Introduction', the subway/underground sign that says-

            'Dogs Must Be Carried On The Escalators'

            To most people (assuming they understand written English) this means
    that if you have a dog, you must carry it when you go on the escalator. But
    that is not the only possible meaning. It could also mean that in order to
    travel on the escalator you must be carrying a dog; or, that 24 hours a day,
    seven days a week, forever, people must constantly travel up and down the
    esacaltors with dogs. There are other possible interpretation Eagleton goes
    through (and other examples, a favourite of mine being 'Refuse To Be Put In
    This Basket').

            Now I assume you're going to say I'm focusing on surface
    expressions, not the underlying patterns, but the question is where does
    meaning lie? In this model of communication meaning does not lie in some
    deep formations of any particular communication. The debate about this in
    literary studies has been intense- particularly the Stanley Fish/Wolfgang
    Iser dispute, over whether or not there is only one 'correct' meaning of a
    text, or whether there are multiple valid meanings of a text.

            Therefore, when one talks about the meaning of theories/concepts, we
    are not talking necessarily about particular neurological patterns, but
    pieces of mediated information. There is no reason to assume that
    'Darwinism' triggers exactly the same pattern in the brains of those who
    accept it, let alone in the brains who simply come across the concept.

            We're probably arguing at cross purposes here, so if this it getting
    frustrating for you feel free to ignore me.

            Vincent

    > ----------
    > From: Chris Lofting
    > Reply To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    > Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2000 8:48 pm
    > To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
    > Subject: RE: Philosophy of Technology: scale and meaning; sameness
    > and difference part 1
    >
    >
    >
    > > -----Original Message-----
    > > From: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk [mailto:fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk]On Behalf
    > > Of Vincent Campbell
    > > Sent: Thursday, 13 July 2000 10:12
    > > To: 'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'
    > > Subject: RE: Philosophy of Technology: scale and meaning; sameness and
    > > difference part 1
    > >
    > >
    > > (6) I don't agree with this at all.
    > >
    >
    > OK..In what way, specifically :-) Do you reject the implicit detection of
    > body language? Do you reject the opposition-bias behaviours that can
    > emerge
    > after the CC is cut? Or perhaps you reject the unconscious? Or more so you
    > reject the structuring of the unconscious?
    >
    >
    >
    > > > (6) My emphasis is that at all levels, when communicating with someone
    > > > else,
    > > > there is consensus-derived communications and so SAME to SAME.
    > > This means
    > > > that all communciations have within them particular formations that
    > are
    > > > encoded such that decoding is at a particular level and the data is
    > not
    > > > necessarily 'meaningful' beyond/outside that level. This means that
    > the
    > > > expressions of the individual, although DIFFERENT at the surface
    > level,
    > > > the
    > > > level of expression, have encoded in them data that is only
    > > interpretable
    > > > at
    > > > the other levels and the full set of interpretations determines the
    > > > overall
    > > > meaning. Thus sensitivity to body language helps to validate the
    > spoken
    > > > word
    > > > etc., we are sensitive to incongruent communications even if we only
    > > > 'feel'
    > > > unsure, the expression etc seemed 'right' but there is something
    > 'wrong'
    > > > which we cannot consciously put our finger on. This demonstrates how
    > at
    > > > the
    > > > same time these levels can operate almost independently of the others;
    > > > they
    > > > are to some degree at least self-contained; autonomous. (As we
    > > find in the
    > > > behaviours of the left and right hemispheres of the brain when
    > > we cut the
    > > > communications channel between them, the corpus callosum, or put one
    > > > hemisphere to 'sleep').
    > > >
    > >
    > >
    >
    >
    > ===============================================================
    > This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    > Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    > For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
    >

    ===============================================================
    This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
    Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
    For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
    see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Fri Jul 14 2000 - 14:11:47 BST