From: Kate Distin (memes@distin.co.uk)
Date: Fri 18 Mar 2005 - 11:38:08 GMT
Scott Chase wrote:
>--- Kate Distin <memes@distin.co.uk> wrote:
>  
>
>
>>Memes in the mind - yes.  Memes in behaviour and/or
>>artefacts - it 
>>depends what you mean by "behaviour" and
>>"artefacts": memes in artefacts 
>>like books and CDs - definitely; memes in spoked
>>wheels (to use one of 
>>Dennett's examples) - no.  Memes, on my view, are
>>fundamentally 
>>representational, so anything that isn't a
>>representation can't be a 
>>meme.  This turns out to be a key point on which I
>>disagree with Dennett 
>>and Blackmore in particular, both of whom use a lot
>>of examples based on 
>>things that I don't see as memes at all. The other
>>major point at which 
>>our views diverge is their claim that the mind is a
>>meme-complex.  I 
>>think we can have our cake and eat it: that memetics
>>is compatible with 
>>a conventional view of the conscious human mind.
>>
>>    
>>
>As for representations, have you read any of Dan
>Sperber's stuff?  
>
>  
>
I have, and like it a lot.  You might not get this impression from my 
book, which has some sections on why I disagree with his view that 
cultural transmission doesn't count as "real" replication - but it's 
true nonetheless!
Kate
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