Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id VAA06194 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Thu, 15 Jun 2000 21:53:07 +0100 Message-Id: <4.3.1.0.20000615145837.01f14790@popmail.mcs.net> X-Sender: aaron@popmail.mcs.net X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.1 Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2000 15:48:42 -0500 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk From: Aaron Lynch <aaron@mcs.net> Subject: RE: Cons and Facades In-Reply-To: <B56E6AE3.7DA%daehler@mindless.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="=====================_625820341==_.ALT" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
At 11:13 AM 6/15/00 -0700, Kris Daehler wrote:
>hello my name is kris daehler. i am new to this list (just discovered it
>yesterday) and to memetics (i just finished susan blackmore's book) but i
>hope you will forgive my butting in--the subject seemed too interesting to
>avoid. thank you all for a very interesting discussion list.
>
>btw, this response is directed specifically at Vincent Campbell's two
>questions about truth, i'm not sure how this will fit in with the
>discussion on cons and facades...
>
>Vincent Campbell wrote:
> >I suppose partly, what I'm thinking of here is something which I think is
> >central to the memetic process, and that is the general desire we all have
> >to pass on 'the truth' whenever we think we know what that is. Of course,
> >sometimes we don't want to tell people, but to those people we like, or are
> >family we usually have a very strong urge to tell people 'the truth' (I
> >guess this might be an inclusive fitness thing).
>
><SNIP>
>
> >I suppose there are two elements to this. First, what is it about certain
> >information that it can induce our notion of it being the truth?
>
>it's possible that the notion of certain information's truth value may
>arise not from quality of the information itself, but rather to its
>relationship to an already acquired memeplex--let's call it a
>truthplex. this truthplex is a meta-notion about the world that includes
>general information about truth, and most importantly, establishes
>criteria for determining what is and isn't truth. so scientists may have
>acquired a truthplex that includes verifiability as a criterion, and
>fundamentalist christians may require compatibility with the bible as a
>criterion. whatever the criteria, if a piece of information satisfies the
>necessary criteria, it is stamped as true. in this way, an idea is only
>true when it has been stamped by the truthplex, and its truth has nothing
>to do with the information itself.
>
> >Second,
> >what is it about 'the truth' that we generally feel a strong desire to pass
> >it on to other people?
>
>most truthplexes seem to include a notion that information stamped as
>"true" are true for everyone everywhere. some truthplexes, like the
>notion of platonic ideals or other religious truthplexes, extend those
>notions through time (i.e. it has always been so and always will be). the
>classic opposite of epistemology seems (to me) to be relativism. as soon
>as a notion's truth value can be seen as contingent on perspective, it
>loses some degree of importance. a successful truthplex guards against
>this by including this notion of universality. this is where the desire
>to spread the truth comes in. if i have an idea "p" that has been stamped
>as true by my truthplex, and i see that you don't believe that p, a
>certain amount of cognitive dissonance has been created. i can resolve
>this dissonance by either removing the truth-stamp from p (which would be
>difficult because i would then have to change the truth criteria built
>into my truthplex) or by manipulating you to get you to stamp p with your
>own truth-stamp. if i get others to recognize p as true, i will have
>resolved the dissonance. so religious missionaries are primarily on a
>mission to resolve the problems *they* have with their own faith (this by
>converting others to prove the universality of their truths).
These are good points, Kris.
Convincing others in order to convince oneself does indeed seem to be one
of the pervasive reasons for trying to win converts. I have previously not
discussed this motive very much, focusing instead on numerous other motives
for evangelizing. This is because on the surface, the self-convincing
motive seems to generally favor a given idea no more than it favors the
opposite idea. So if this were the only motive for evangelizing, we might
expect atheists to evangelize as intensely as theists. Yet when we bring in
the differing levels of insecurity people have about their beliefs, we
might expect the motive of self-convincing to disproportionately favor the
spread of beliefs about which adherents have the greatest unresolved
doubts. Projecting the image of self-certainty might be an unconscious
facade given both to oneself and to others.
Relativism seems to have yet another interesting consequence, at least for
some. Accepting the idea that "truth is relative" can make one more likely
to reach the conclusion that "telling the truth" does not matter. This can
then become a cognitive "justification" for telling lies, that is, making
statements that are stamped as "untrue" or in the mind of the teller, or
that the teller uses to deceive or mislead the recipient.
If relativism is more prevalent in some fields than others, it could lead
to lower levels of honesty. That, in turn, could tend to subvert the
scientific method more for some fields than for others, and ultimately give
some fields worse reputations than others.
As Wade quoted from Twain, "the finest lie is a carefully measured portion
of the truth." Selection forces in the sciences may tend to favor "finer"
lies over coarser lies, and more finely measured portions of truth than
coarsely measured portions. If bad attitudes, relativism leading to lying,
etc. generate more lies in some fields than in others, it could again cause
more problems for the most affected fields.
"Bad attitudes" are indeed a pervasive element in the modern USA and many
other countries, especially in adolescents. (I think things often change
around the time one has children to raise, and can see that a "bad
attitude" imitated by an unsophisticated young child will lead to
disaster.) But many products are now marketed by appeals to "bad attitude,"
such as "the luxury car with attitude," etc. Even an article about Dawkins
was marketed with an appeal to "bad attitudes" sometime in the mid 1990s:
Dawkins's picture appeared on the cover of Wired Magazine with a caption
that called him "evolution's bad boy" or some such.
--Aaron Lynch
>it's also important to note that people may have varying levels of truth
>stamps. we may have different forms of truth e.g. supremely true (god
>exists/does not exist), pragmatically true (i do/don't control my
>actions), scientifically true (my actions are/are not caused by
>biochemical processes), etc. this explains how people can often have
>multiple notions of truth, even conflicting understandings of the same
>subject... a complex truthplex may accomodate many different forms of truth.
>
>
>again, thank you all for an exceptional and fruitful discussion...
>
>kris
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Jun 15 2000 - 21:53:53 BST