Re: I know one when I see one

From: joedees@bellsouth.net
Date: Fri 01 Nov 2002 - 22:32:29 GMT

  • Next message: joedees@bellsouth.net: "Re: I know one when I see one"

    >
    > On Friday, November 1, 2002, at 12:58 , joedees@bellsouth.net wrote:
    >
    > > Selection and mutation happen mainly internally and cognitively,
    > > while communication and transmission - that is, attempts at
    > > replication - is an external action function.
    >
    > Selection and mutation also happen in the transmission, and even in
    > the performance. I have no idea whether or not anything in the mind
    > 'mutates' or gets 'selected' until I see a performance.
    >
    The fact that you cannot observe something does not entail that it does not exist, or otherwise rocks would be molecule-thin shells.
    >
    > And, again, even the performer is unaware, at all times, of the
    > _actuality_ of his performance (as this is, as you pointed out, always
    > a _future_ event, as the neural firings precede the muscular
    > activations), regardless of skill level or interior preparation. (Yes,
    > this bit of neurological news was the actual tipping point eureka
    > kernel of physical fact that popped the whole pemetic model into view
    > for me.)
    >
    It is also the kernal that experimentally establishes the chronological precedence of the thought over the action.
    >
    > Rarely does anyone ever say, 'gee, that happened just as I thought it
    > would', although that is not, with good controls, and/or elementary
    > requirements for performance, unlikely. Cultures continue precisely
    > because performances are likely to be close if not indistinguishable
    > replications of the original, since the culture itself sets the
    > requirements for the performance. But each performance is a new one, a
    > different one, by a different self, in a different time and space.
    > Cultures are, if nothing else and not illusory, the stage set and
    > technical directions for performance.
    >
    Different in the sense of being not identical but not different in the absolute sense, as beign nonrelational. And they relate precisely as individual effects of a common internal memetic cause.
    >
    > - Wade
    >
    >
    >
    > ===============================================================
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    > see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
    >

    =============================================================== This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit



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