From: AaronLynch@aol.com
Date: Mon 28 Oct 2002 - 22:53:19 GMT
In a message dated 10/27/2002 5:00:34 PM Central
Standard Time, Keith Henson <hkhenson@cogeco.ca> writes:
At 10:49 AM 25/10/02 -0700, you wrote:
>All:
>
>> Dawkins begins his definition of "meme" in "The Extended
>> Phenotype" with, "A unit of cultural inheritance". In
>> recent discussions I have assumed that that was a necessary
>> part of any definition of "meme".(That seems not to be the
>> case for everyone, however. ;-))
>
>> I propose that "A unit of cultural inheritance" is also
>> sufficient to define a meme, and thus, is an acceptable
>> standard definition.
> There are several alternative expressions which amount to
> the same thing. I usually use "replicating information
> pattern." And, of course, the culture does not have to be
> human. I have talked to Dawkins about this and he has no
> problem with it. As for a meme, the only part that is
> essential is the information. This is in close analogy to
> genetics were a listing on paper of base pairs for some
> protein is a gene.
Hi Keith.
A non-objection comment by made many years ago by Dawkins
does not solve anything. It just becomes another item in
the debate over what did he mean and when did he mean it.
If Dawkins seriously cared about having a science of memes,
I believe he would have long since written a serious
journal article to clear up the confusion in highly
explicit technical terms, and to explain WHY he defines a
term the way he does or WHY he favors any changes in
meaning from what he has said in early pieces. On might say
that "yes, but DAWKINS is too important for such things."
However, he has in 2001 accepted a $100,000 Kistler prize
basically for having coined the word meme and written a
handful of non-technical articles using it. Unfortunately,
even if Dawkins steps in to offer a new clarification
tomorrow, the definitional confusion has already made its
mark in dictionaries and other works.
Against the backdrop of all the speculation among those
using the term "meme," and criticism of definitional
vagueness by serious scholars, Dawkins's not objecting to
what you have told him or to what I have told him strikes
me as a resounding "yeah, whatever!" He could very well
have given his non-objection to numerous mutually
contradictory definitions.
I have previously commented on the equivocal nature of
Dawkins's promotion of memes in the past several years. On
this list, some of those comments regard his 1999 article
in Time Magazine. (I assume the archives are still there
for that year.) That article called attention to various
popular and web based works, but did not mention technical
works or JOM. In particular, he poked derision at the idea
of "St. Dawkin." It would be foolish to assume that he only
meant to deride a single occurrence of that phrase on the
web. In my judgement, he is poking fun at a whole movement:
those who insist on making him a figurehead for a
collection of theories that he does not especially support
any more. (People might want, in effect, to pillory me for
thus blaspheming "St. Dawkin," but that would only further
justify Dawkin's own implied derision.)
Dawkins's recent endorsements of books can also be read as
flattering to authors and books while undercutting the
theories expressed. His latest book endorsement indicates
that he was actually surprised to see that there was more
to say about memes. That, in my view, suggests that he
regards memetics as dead end science.
I made a serious effort to use the word "meme" in my
evolutionary cultural replicator work. I got involved in
ultimately futile debates over definitions of "meme." So I
will not try that again. It was Martin Gardner who finally
convinced me to seriously consider no longer relying on the
word. In 2000, Martin Gardner had published an article
criticizing various meme works, including my book Thought
Contagion. I wrote to Gardner and showed him my technical
work and a draft of my contribution to Sternberg's book The
Evolution of Intelligence. Gardner was very impressed with
those works, and thanked me for showing them to him. But he
strongly recommended that I do without the word "meme." So
I began researching the history of the definitional
confusion by re-reading some old works. I found that
Dawkins had indeed vacillated on the definition without
giving any reasons for changing definitions. Under those
circumstances, and without any subsequent serious
clarifications from him, I realized that serious
definitional problems were likely to persist.
So I published newer works of evolutionary cultural
replicator theory of ideas without relying on the word
"meme." Nevertheless, correspondence has suggested that
some people place more priority on using the word than on
clear scientific communications.
There was an earlier thread about whether memes are ideas.
To me, if there is so much doubt, then why not simply use a
term for which there is less doubt. Yes, one can argue
about the various meanings of the word "idea" as well. And
changing terminology is unlikely to sooth any enraged
academics -- they might actually become louder in reaction
to greater clarity given to messages they don't like. But
at least I do not have to deal with leading skeptics such
as Gardner (and others) getting the misimpression that I am
being evasive about the meaning of the word. Nor do I have
to deal with people insisting that only external behaviors
or artifacts can qualify as "ideas."
Shortly after dropping reliance on the word "meme," one
person wrote to me to say that I should regard the word
"meme" as a brand name. As I explained in my reply, the
fact that the word "meme" has become a brand is actually
one of the problems that I and many scientists have with
it. We do not want to be seen as pushing a brand, but
rather, proposing tentative ideas that we ourselves will
drop if evidence warrants. No one expects real scientific
discourse with brand promoters or brand loyalists. In
particular, brand promoters cannot be expected to let
"mere" scientific evidence lead them to drop a claim or to
stop hyping their brand. In brand marketing, it can be good
business to keep pushing a bad product if the brand name is
popular. Such behavior is much less appropriate in science,
however. This is another way that brand status turns off
many scientists. You just do not even try to engage in real
discourse with people paid to promote a brand. Instead, you
expect them to carry on with brand marketing behaviors for
as long as profitable: taboos against mentioning anything
seen as "brand X," the use of misleading gimmicks,
fictional characters, etc. Having this kind of behavior
connected with the word "meme," is actually a serious
indictment against the status of "memetics" as science.
Efforts to define the word "meme" may also have been used
as roundabout ways to attempt to control research agendas.
Then, even when people attempted to define the term merely
for clarity, even that might have aroused suspicions that
they were really also just trying to control the research
agenda. This might be one (but not the only) source of
acrimony that erupted in some of the definitional disputes.
While the word "meme" has a bunch of derivatives that work
like those of the word "gene," this actually causes still
more trouble. On the one hand, some might like the
similarities. There is an aura of high achievement and
prestige in genetics and evolutionary genetics. So using
similar terms may offer the unconscious attraction of
allowing evolutionary cultural replicator researchers to
share a piece of the aura surrounding genetic biology.
Unfortunately, this very possibility also stirs deep and
perhaps often unconscious suspicion of those who use the
term. People can easily regard use of the word "meme" as an
attempt to grab some of that aura without first having
established a highly advanced and useful science. This is a
problem that did not exist for the word "gene" when it was
introduced. A better alternative for cultural replicator
work might be to pursue the scientific advancements first
and foremost. Then, only if and when a highly advanced and
useful science emerges, let it accrete its own aura of
success.
-- Aaron Lynch
===============================================================
This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.5 : Mon 28 Oct 2002 - 22:57:36 GMT