Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id RAA00352 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 22 May 2000 17:33:01 +0100 Message-ID: <39291A61.5AC555AC@mediaone.net> Date: Mon, 22 May 2000 12:30:41 +0100 From: chuck <cpalson@mediaone.net> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; I) X-Accept-Language: en To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Why are human brains bigger? References: <2D1C159B783DD211808A006008062D31CEB1C9@inchna.stir.ac.uk> <00052216252702.00758@faichney> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
Robin Faichney wrote:
> However, that misses the point I was trying to make linking belief with
> action. It seems to me that a member of a simpler species might well
> exhibit behaviour quite similar to that of a human who had the
> hunting area belief. So what's the difference (if any)? The human
> thinks "I believe this, and I want to influence my comrades, because
> not only will we have success in our hunting, but I'll get the credit".
> And the animal doesn't! So what I'm saying is that belief and the
> self-concept go together, and action goes right along with them. The
> animal can be said to have a sort of working hypothesis, but it does
> not have a concept with which it identifies: "I, me, my belief!". Nor
> does it act on the basis of such a belief -- it just does what it's
> inclined to do. Susan Blackmore would have us be just like that, and
> I'm inclined to agree with her.
As usual, I think that the distinction between animal and human may be overdrawn
here. I find Robin's particular example quite germane, because I think that the
kind of consciousness that we ordinarily call self consciousness that is
implicit in the example MUST be a characteristic of any sexually reproducing
social species. These characteristics have two problems they must deal with to
survive: each individual 1) contains a bundle of self interests which is unique
and therefore conflicts with every other individual 2) each individual must
participate in cooperative efforts to survive and these efforts necessarily
involve supressing the expression of conflicting interests. Therefore, there
must be a mechanism, a monitor in Pinker's words, that monitors and compares the
difference between the two. We constantly scheme ***in our language*** to
monitor the difference -- an example being Robin's example above. I think that
the difference between animals and ourselves is probably that we do it in our
native language and the animals do it in their "mentalese." We probably have our
mentalese also, but we can't talk about it.
In sum, I am arguing that there has to be a monitoring mechanism that compares
and calculates our own individual interests and how that must wedged somehow
into cooperative activities.
>
> --
> Robin Faichney
>
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This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission
For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing)
see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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