Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id FAA22882 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sat, 23 Feb 2002 05:33:40 GMT Message-Id: <5.0.2.1.0.20020222232227.00a61bb0@mail.clarityconnect.com> X-Sender: rrecchia@mail.clarityconnect.com X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 5.0.2 Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2002 00:26:32 -0500 To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk From: Ray Recchia <rrecchia@mail.clarityconnect.com> Subject: Re: ality In-Reply-To: <004901c1bbfa$4bcb0920$b686b2d1@teddace> References: <1197713187-10325037@smtp.clarityconnect.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
At 03:40 PM 2/22/2002 -0800, you wrote:
> > > Once again the same problem. Generic insults like "oversimplified
> > > assertion" do nothing to prove your point. They're a symptom of
> > > insecurity. You're afraid some of the people on this list might not be
> > > as smart as you and might require help in arriving at the "correct"
> > > interpretation.
> > >
> > I stand by my statement. It was an attack on your logic not an attack on
> > your person. The fact that the brain makes mistakes does not invalidate
> > a physical memory hypothesis
>
>Nor have I ever claimed it does.
Snip - from a previous post
>If, on the other hand, memories are stored in the brain, our
>recall should be as precise and accurate as a computer retrieving data.
>That our memories are reconstructed is a problem for the mechanistic view,
>not mine.
So what was that you were saying?
> > and is a generic oversimplification.
>
>Exactly. You're caricaturing my position with a gross oversimplification
>and then dismissing it on that basis.
You did the over simplification. I just pointed it out.
> > On the other hand this statement
> >
> > >Gotta love those passive-aggressives
> >
> > from the end of the next post has nothing to do with our discussion here.
>
>Nor was it intended to further our discussion. It was a reaction to your
>sublimated hostility. Unlike you, when I get personal, I'm up front about
>it.
Yes. And of course it is just a sign of your frustration.
> > The inconsistency in your position on personal attacks is also visible in
> > the logic behind your 'mind and memory' position.
> >
> > For example
> >
> > You offer
> > > The point is that the mind, not the brain, imperfectly recalls the past,
>as
> > > we would expect, since the past isn't around anymore and therefore has
> > > to be reconstructed. On the other hand, if memory were a computer-like
> > > storage device, it should function with roughly the same degree of
> > > accuracy found in computers themselves.
> >
> > as explanation for why the mind recalls imperfectly but later you say
> >
> > > Rather,
> > > the past remains present, despite no longer being spatio-materialized.
> > > Time is absolute and singular. There's no succession of discrete
> > > "moments." There's one moment, and the moment remains present.
> > > Time is fluid. There's no boundary to set off existence (present) from
> > > oblivion (past). There's no demarcation-- look all you want. The
> > > present bleeds into past. The true present embraces all of time-- what
> > > is "past" up to and including the material present. The brain is the
> > > material present of the mind. The mind traverses time just as the
> > > brain traverses space. The mind perceives the past as easily as the
> > > eye/brain perceives light.
> >
> > So in one paragraph your explanation for imperfections is that the past
> > isn't around anymore. Three paragraphs later you say that it actually is.
>
>Instead of trying to understand my point,
>you're fishing for contradictions.
>As I stated in my post, the mind perceives the *form* of the past, not its
>appearance, which must be reconstructed. The past isn't *materially* around
>anymore.
>
> > Even if you take the first paragraph by itself you still have no
> > explanation for why the process of reconstruction would be imperfect.
> > You just state that it naturally follows that since it is reconstruction
> > it must of necessity be imperfect. Good old res ipsa loquitor.
>
>You snipped the paragraph in which I spelled it out:
>
>"The past is intangible. It's got no material substance. Doesn't take up
>any space. And even if it did, there's no light to bounce off it. The past
>is dark. What we remember is the form of the event, not its appearance.
>Memory requires (imaginary) sets and lighting. Naturally it's not going to
>display computer-like accuracy."
I think I'll partially agree with you here. The only way to perceive the
past with the mind is by using the imagination. There are probably other
ways of imagining it without stages and lighting though.
> > And once again you have no explanation for how neurons facilitate this.
>
>Nor is any explanation required. My argument is a priori and must be dealt
>with on logical terms. You've got your head stuck in your posteriori.
But your self-evident axioms aren't self-evident to anyone here but you.
Which makes them quite a bit less than self-evident. The only person doing
the midgaard serpent imitation here is you.
> > > > And you don't have any mechanism that you can connect to the
> > > > brain. You simply have no explanation for how neurons do this.
> > >
> > > That we can view a coin from opposite perspectives doesn't mean
> > > "heads" and "tails" are separate objects. No need for any connections.
> > > The mind is no more reducible to the brain than vice versa, any more
> > > than tails might be reducible to heads or the other way round.
> >
> > In other words even though memory is located someplace else
>
>Memory has no spatial location. The past is nowhere.
But the brain can peer over it after it has grabbed some of that imaginary
lighting.
> > actual thinking processes are created by the functioning of neurons.
> > Somehow all the alleged problems that apply to memory don't apply to
> > the process of thought itself.
>
>Thoughts are not reducible to neurons (and their synaptic connections).
>Thinking involves representation, which is not a physical or chemical
>property. That which represents the world cannot simultaneously be part of
>the world represented. To ascribe representation to the brain is to endow
>it with a magical property possessed by no other object, living or dead.
>You're setting the brain apart, i.e. sacralizing it. This is your religion.
So on the one hand brain and mind are just different aspects of the same
thing. On the other hand you don't need to be able explain how the two are
connected. It just follows from their definitions. Open mouth. Insert tail.
Ray Recchia
And of course once again you make another broad oversimplfication that is
readily refutable. Scott already got this one.
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