Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id CAA08756 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Mon, 15 May 2000 02:50:52 +0100 Message-ID: <391F1256.EA5CBBB3@mediaone.net> Date: Sun, 14 May 2000 21:53:42 +0100 From: Chuck Palson <cpalson@mediaone.net> X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (WinNT; I) X-Accept-Language: en To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: Abortion views and face time References: <NBBBIIDKHCMGAIPMFFPJOEAGENAA.richard@brodietech.com> Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------35620D2569E2B314038754BE" Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
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Richard Brodie wrote:
> Chuck wrote:
>
> <<My
> assumption that beliefs (in morality or anything else) are adaptations to
> environments is pretty solid given that beliefs ALWAYS change when the
> environment changes. The latter always precedes the former.>>
>
> So the picture on my TV screen is an adaptation to my remote control?
I am confused here. Neither is a belief -- although you have to believe the
remote works after a while because -- it does. So your beliefs about a remote
are accurate because you test them out over time.
>
>
> "Adaptation," in evolutionary science, has a very specific meaning. It
> refers to a change in genetic makeup that produces a phenotypic effect that
> enhances the fitness of the organism. By analogy (which doesn't always work
> well in memetics) an memetic adaptation of a mind virus or memeplex would be
> a shift in beliefs of adherents that enhances the fitness of the virus...
Obviously I use adaptation in a non-phenotypic way. As for fitness of the virus
by which you mean the meme, I still don't see how this enhances our
understanding. It seems to me that real biological fitness is the issue here -
why make it into a metaphor? The "meme," if you will, can enhance the fitness of
the brain.
> Given your position that people choose beliefs that are best
Best is really the wrong word. First, I just want to make sure that when you say
people, you mean people on average. Individuals can choose beliefs that subtract
from fitness. Second, assuming we are talking about the average (which I am), it
is still possible for the average to be inappropriate; groups can also do the
wrong thing as animals can, and extinction can and does result. I am saying that
the appropriateness of choices to reality, to fitness, must be proven. However,
I am also saying that so far I have been able to demonstrate in every case I
have found across time and space that those humans who have survived have made
choices that enhance fitness.
> what
> would "adaptation" mean? Make them more likely to reproduce? Make them have
> more earning potential? Make them happier? How would this work functionally?
I would never use happiness as a criterion. Happiness for the most part is a
relative measure - how you are doing relative to others at the time. I'm happy
when I get a 20% raise on Friday; that happiness is diminished on Monday when I
learn that everyone in the company got the same raise.
By adaptation in the examples I have been describing, I mean being able to "make
a living" within a society that represents a particular type of economy (I have
defined economy as exchange of goods and services in an economy; much of this is
not related to the cash economy - as in the economy of a family relationship). I
am not talking about ultimate causation which, I think, is where fitness comes
in.
>
>
> Do you really think people consciously choose their beliefs? I have spent
> much of my time the last 10 years teaching people how to do this. I do not
> believe most people consciously choose their beliefs at all, but tend to
> adopt ones they have learned growing up, that fit into their existing belief
> system with little dissonance, or that are simply comforting to entertain. I
> don't see evidence that these beliefs benefit their holder other than to
> relieve immediate cognitive dissonance.
You are asking two questions: 1) is the choice conscious? Using a rough
commonsense notion of what is consciousness, sometimes yes, sometimes no. I
don't see why anyone would insist that choices have to be conscious to be goal
oriented (or to change that goal orientation). 2) why do people often stick with
earlier methods of making choices despite your own efforts to change that into a
more "rational" way.
The answer to the second question is more complex. Sometimes the teacher is not
aware of the nature of the entire stage that his students have to move in. For
example, I can remember that capitalists in the third world thought the
employees "irrational" because no amount of money would motivate them to work
longer hours. But it turns out the investors had to understand a much broader
stage: the workers had a whole series of mutual obligations which had great
non-cash value. They could not bet that the cash would keep coming in the rest
of their lives; they had to maintain their mutual support network which they
knew would last the rest of their lives.
Second, teachers are quite often not aware of how even they themeselves make
decisions. They, like scientists, tell a plausible story after the fact to
describe how they in fact DIDN'T make the decision. The work of Gary Klein is
interesting on this matter. Experts often think they have ESP, but Klein shows
that it was actually real knowledge that solved the problem; they were just
unconscious of it. Klein can now teach others to be experts by uncovering this
hidden knowledge.
Third, brain scans and other technology shows that we almost never make
decisions based on the neat decision trees that tell us how to make decisions.
That's only the case in very formal situations. The lymbic system makes the
decision, and our conscious brain then rationalizes it and makes us think we did
it all consciously.
So in conclusion, there are lots of reasons why you might not be able to teach a
perfectly rational way to make a set of decisions.
>
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