Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id HAA02858 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Wed, 29 Mar 2000 07:56:14 +0100 Message-ID: <A4400389479FD3118C9400508B0FF230040BE5@DELTA.newhouse.akzonobel.nl> From: "Gatherer, D. (Derek)" <D.Gatherer@organon.nhe.akzonobel.nl> To: "'memetics@mmu.ac.uk'" <memetics@mmu.ac.uk> Subject: Game theory Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2000 08:52:49 +0200 X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2650.21) Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
In PNAS this week:
Kevin A. McCabe and Vernon L. Smith
A comparison of naïve and sophisticated subject behavior with game
theoretic predictions
PNAS 2000 97: 3777-3781
We use an extensive form two-person game as the basis for two experiments
designed to compare the behavior of two groups of subjects with each other
and with the subgame perfect theoretical prediction in an anonymous
interaction protocol. The two subject groups are undergraduates and advanced
graduate students, the latter having studied economics and game theory.
There is no difference in their choice behavior, and both groups depart
substantially from game theoretic predictions. We also compare a subsample
of the same graduate students with a typical undergraduate sample in an
asset trading environment in which inexperienced undergraduates invariably
produce substantial departures from the rational expectations prediction. In
this way, we examine how robust are the results across two distinct
anonymous interactive environments. In the constant sum trading game, the
graduate students closely track the predictions of rational theory. Our
interpretation is that the graduate student subjects' departure from subgame
perfection to achieve cooperative outcomes in the two-person bargaining game
is a consequence of a deliberate strategy and is not the result of error or
inadequate learning.
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/reprint/97/7/3777
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