Re: Monkeys stone herdsman in Kenya

From: Mark M. Mills (mmills@htcomp.net)
Date: Sat Mar 04 2000 - 10:41:35 GMT

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    Subject: Re: Monkeys stone herdsman in Kenya
    Date: Sat, 4 Mar 00 10:41:35 -0000
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    From: "Mark M. Mills" <mmills@htcomp.net>
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    Joe,

    >... My position is in many ways a
    >synthesis of Lynch and Gatherer, as I do not see how memes can
    >fulfill their evolutionary and multiplicative functions without both
    >components (within and between) of the single memetic coin.

    I doubt the Lynch and Gatherer definitions blend very well.

    We probably all agree that there are 'behaviors' and 'neural foundations'
    for behaviors. It seems unnecessarily confusing to claim both are a
    meme. Gatherer defines meme as the behavior itself. Lynch defines the
    meme as the neural foundation. Both are fairly straight forward and both
    have their own logic, their own model. Determining which model provides
    the most utility seems similar to deciding between Copernican and
    Ptolemaic celestial models. I don't think one can blend Copernican and
    Ptolemy.

    >Our conscious awareness is the most concrete of all things we
    >experience, as it is that which contains and makes possible both
    >our experience....

    The notion that consciousness 'contains' anything or is a 'thing' is at
    best literary and metaphorical. Scientifically, consciousness contains
    nothing, it has no volume, nor physical boundaries.

    Since Aristophanes lampooned Socrates in 'The Clouds,' we have a
    continuous literary record of debate over how to value conscious
    awareness. The scientific revolution is all about ignoring the illusion
    that metaphorical elements of conscious awareness are 'real' until one
    can replicate experimental results independently. The scientist says
    'lets adapt our metaphorical models to conform with empirical results of
    experimentation.'

    Sure, your 'conscious awareness' is the most concrete of your own
    personal experiental sensations, but it is scientifically the most
    difficult to independently qualify. It is a weak foundation for
    scientific work.

    >As to it being, unlike behavior,
    >untestable, if you don't like the cutting-edge cognitive mapping
    >being currently done by those in the forefront of the psychological
    >establishment via PET and fMRI, here's a simple one. Ask a
    >sample population to do something easy for a million dollars, then
    >remove their brains and ask for the same behavior again. I
    >guarantee that the scientifically measurable response will be rather
    >dampened in the second case.

    The images recorded by PET and fMRI are behavioral records. A PET scan
    image and a photo of a smile both represent behavioral records. They are
    not records of 'consciousness.' Additionally, almost all mammals display
    the same PET scan artifacts as humans. If PET scan artifacts represent
    consciousness, almost all mammals would be conscious.

    As to the experiment proposed, consider performing it with 3
    participants: one dead with brain removed, one dead, brain removed, with
    concealed mechanical arms capable of producing a naturalistic smile
    operated by a man listening to in. The third is a normal, alert
    individual. Put each in an isolation unit and ask them 'Please smile.'
    Test subject #1 (dead, no brain) fails to react. Test subject #2 smiles.
    Test subject #3 smiles.

    Using the Gatherer definition, subject #2 and #3 produced identical
    'smile' memes. Being alive had nothing to do with presence of the meme.

    Using the Lynch definition, only subject #3 displayed evidence of the
    smile meme,since it was the only one with neural tissue capable of
    producing the smile behavior. If there was a meme involved with subject
    #2, it exists in the brain of the operator.

    I find the Lynch definition the most useful model for evaluation the
    above experimental results.

    >If memes just lived
    >within minds they could not replicate,...

    As I mentioned in my previous post, the Lynch meme is replicated by a
    feedback process involving action and observation. Isomorphism is of
    meme replication is measured at the level of behavioral conformity to
    standards and ability to play role in various Markoff chains of
    replicated behavior. It is not measured at the level of neural
    specifics. Many neural configurations can produce identical behaviors,
    just as many unique DNA sequences can produce identical proteins.

    Mark

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