Received: by alpheratz.cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk id JAA17759 (8.6.9/5.3[ref pg@gmsl.co.uk] for cpm.aca.mmu.ac.uk from fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk); Sun, 20 Feb 2000 09:04:12 GMT From: Robin Faichney <robin@faichney.demon.co.uk> Organization: Reborn Technology To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk Subject: Re: meaning in memetics, Date: Sun, 20 Feb 2000 08:11:58 +0000 X-Mailer: KMail [version 1.0.21] Content-Type: text/plain References: <200002181855.NAA15941@mail5.lig.bellsouth.net> Message-Id: <00022008274701.00482@faichney> Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Sender: fmb-majordomo@mmu.ac.uk Precedence: bulk Reply-To: memetics@mmu.ac.uk
I somehow lost the original from Alex to which Joe is replying here, so I'm
using this to reply to Alex.
On Fri, 18 Feb 2000, Joe E. Dees wrote:
>>
>> > >"what is preserved and transmitted in cultural evolution is *information* - in a media-neutral,
>> > >language-neutral sense. Thus the meme is primarily a *semantic* classification, not a *syntactic*
>> > >classification that might be directly observable in "brain language" or natural language."
>> >
>> > What he's saying here is that the meme is encoded, not straight physical
>> > information. The encoding can, and does, vary, but the encoded message remains
>> > the same. No?
>> >
>>
>> Well, somewhat in disagreement with what Joe said, yes. It's a different yes. Yes the encoded message
>> remains the same, but it depends what you mean by encoded. If you mean it in the semantic sense then
>> yes I agree that the encoded message remains the same - hence memes are primarily a "semantic
>> classification". But it seems (in light of what you've said previously) that you're invoking the idea of
>> encoding as some syntactic, meaning-neutral phenomenon ("the encoding can vary, but the encoded
>> message remains the same), and this I think is wrong.
Please help me understand this distinction. You seem to be saying that in both
what you call semantic encoding, and syntactic encoding, the meaning remains
the same, while the encoding can vary. So what is the distinction, for you,
that makes one interpretation of "semantics is encoded" valid and the other
invalid? (But read on before replying to that, because what follows might make
it redundant.)
>> >> Look at this collection of lines and points:
>>
>> .. . . _
>>
>> What's that? I mean, as physical information as you call it, what is it? It's not much is it? And if you put
>> this configuration on a mountain side, on paper or write it in stars in the sky that are actually millions of
>> light years apart, it's still not really anything. That is until you CODE it. When you say that this
>> configuration is code FOR something, it starts to have meaning - it start to have a semantic value that will
>> link the stars you saw in the sky, to the configuration on paper that previously were unrelated, and make
>> them mean something, where previously there were just two configurations that were the same
>> serendipitously. The meaning is what made the difference. When you know that this configuration is code
>> (morse code, actually) FOR somethihng, then it becomes interesting, it becomes something to foster an
>> academic subject about. Because all of a sudden we can discern which instances of the configuration
>> were just fluke (weren't MEANT) and which weren't. Dot-dot-dot-dash is morse code for V (apparently)
>> and V is for Victory - it might mean something else, say if you wanted to meet your friend at Victoria
>> station and you only had one letter with which to transmit the message.
>>
>> So when you see the constellation in the sky, although it's the same configuration, you know it means
>> nothing (unless for example a soldier in a fellow division told you to look at x angle in the sky - a message
>> that his division had won a battle - or he told you to listen to the first four notes of Beethoven's fifth
>> [da-da-da-dah]).
>>
>> To reiterate, the configuration in its pure sense, doesn't mean anything at all, and in light of that, there's
>> very little point in trying to construct a theory of human behaviour and society around it.
OK, maybe I begin to see what you're trying to say here. I say to this, there
certainly is such a point, if what you're interested in is this: what, exactly,
do we have to add to that bare configuration, to make possible a theory of human
behaviour and society? Saying it's not enough, is not enough. What we have
to say is, what is enough? And in particular, out of what, exactly, does
intentionality emerge? That's what I'm interested in, and that's why I start
at such a low level, as bare physical information. What I'm currently working
towards is a *memetic* explanation of intentionality.
-- Robin Faichney===============================This was distributed via the memetics list associated with the Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission For information about the journal and the list (e.g. unsubscribing) see: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit
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